A Case Study of Organizations' Persuasive Efforts with the Syrian Opposition
Embargo until
Date
2015-01-17
Authors
Journal Title
Journal ISSN
Volume Title
Publisher
Johns Hopkins University
Abstract
Abstract
This case study compared a Switzerland based non-governmental organization (NGO) and a U.S. based NGO’s persuasive efforts with the Syrian armed opposition to cease their practice of killing and harming civilians (civilian targeting). The Swiss NGO portion entailed in-depth interviews with staff and a training partner as well as a qualitative content analysis of campaign videos, training booklets and modules, a conference report, a strategy document, and opposition authored code of conduct documents. The U.S. NGO portion involved an in-depth interview with an expert from its Middle East office and a qualitative content analysis of organizational press releases, full reports, and letters as well as opposition authored letters to the U.S. NGO. The findings revealed that the Swiss and U.S. NGOs had some similar approaches including utilizing some of the same social media channels, advocating costs for committing civilian targeting, and emphasizing their neutrality in their organizations’ portrayal. Alternatively, other aspects of their approaches differed such as the degree to which they relied on interpersonal networks and written communiqués as channels, if they primarily leveraged direct messaging or both direct and indirect messaging, if they emphasized the benefits of ceasing civilian targeting, how they leveraged partnerships, and their commitment strategies. The Swiss NGO’s dissemination channels included meetings and trainings that incorporated techniques such as role playing, campaign videos, and booklets; future channels will leverage mobile apps and card games. The U.S. NGO’s channels comprised written communiqués, Al Arabiya, Al Jazeera, Facebook, Twitter, and YouTube. Both NGOs addressed the opposition’s hostile attitudes towards civilian Alawites and civilian regime supporters. The Swiss NGO directly messaged opposition groups and tailored messages to a group’s views of international and Islamic laws; messages stressed the costs of committing civilian targeting and the benefits of ceasing the behavior. Alternatively, the U.S. NGO directly messaged opposition groups about the costs of civilian targeting and indirectly messaged certain opposition groups, by reaching out to third parties, such as Gulf states, with perceived influence on these groups on ways to inflict costs on them for their civilian targeting. Both NGOs placed a priority on portraying their neutrality. The Swiss NGO relied on local Syrian partners to gain access and build trust with opposition groups, while the U.S. NGO leveraged partnerships to bolster messaging around the costs of civilian targeting. Additionally, the Swiss NGO, adopting a long-term approach, used formal and informal commitment strategies depending on the opposition group. The U.S. NGO presented opposition groups with opportunities to make public written commitments to stop their civilian targeting. Finally, various recommendations are offered for communication practitioners seeking to influence the opposition and similar armed non-state actors including: employing channels such as interpersonal networks, Al Arabiya, Al Jazeera, Facebook, Twitter, and YouTube; segmenting opposition audiences based on a group’s beliefs, attitudes, or nationalities; messaging groups about the costs of conducting civilian targeting and the benefits of ceasing the behavior; partnering with organizations opposition groups trust; and pursuing long-term approaches that empower opposition groups to make commitments to civilian protection.
Description
Keywords
Persuasion, Syrian Opposition, NGOs, Non-State Actors, Influence, Persuasive Messaging, Case Study, Middle East, Syria, International Humanitarian Law