

THE WESTERN DETERRENCE POLICY REGIME AGAINST A RESURGENT
RUSSIA IN THE POST-COLD WAR SECURITY ENVIRONMENT: FAILURES AND
A WAY AHEAD FOR THE FUTURE

by
Rachael Deskin

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Abstract

Aggressive Russian foreign policy and accompanying military actions have destabilized Europe's periphery in the post-Cold War security environment. The occupation and annexation of the Georgian territories of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, along with the annexation of Crimea and the continued conflict in the Donbass region of eastern Ukraine prove that the West's Deterrence Policy regime is ineffective. This thesis analyzes how and why the Western Deterrence Policy regime against Russia has failed and examines prospects for the future. To gain an understanding of this issue, this thesis portfolio will review Western foreign and security policy mistakes through a Spiral and Deterrence Model analysis and analyze how the West found itself in the current security dilemma with Russia due to NATO and United States' (US) actions. The result will be a way-ahead for the European Union (EU), as the best-suited actor to successfully deter Russia, so it can create successful a Deterrence Policy regime against Russia by making necessary changes to its Common Foreign and Security Policy.

The first chapter in this portfolio analyzes how the US ineffectively created policy towards Russia through the Deterrence Model instead of the Spiral Model. As a result of misapplied Deterrence Model policies, Russia reacted via the Spiral Model and a post-Cold War security dilemma ensued as a result of Russia's perception of these seemingly offensive Western policies. The second chapter examines why NATO, and thus the US, has failed in the deterrence of Russia because a deeply rooted mistrust between the US/NATO and Russia effectively precludes any sort of meaningful relationship. The US is unwilling to face Russia head on, and, as such, Europe has no recourse due to a lack of real military power.

This portfolio concludes that, since NATO, and thus the US, cannot successfully create or signal policy created correctly via the Deterrence or Spiral Model due to a historical and deeply rooted mistrust, and since the US and NATO are unwilling to utilize force to response to aggressive Russian military action on Europe's periphery, the EU must act. This portfolio closes with recommendations that will enable the EU to not only escape its current integration dilemma with Russia, but also to become a successful deterrent to Russia. The EU must first become a real security actor on the international stage by deliberately evolving its strategic culture to allow for the use of *both* hard and soft power and by making real progress on pooling and sharing programs that require an increase in defense spending in an effort to modernize and equip European forces.

Advisor: Dr. Dorothea Wolfson

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Preface

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Introduction

In the decades following the end of the Cold War, the US and Europe took significant actions to build and expand political and military alliances in an effort to deter modern Russia from consolidating land and power as did its predecessor, Soviet Russia.¹ The 2008 Russian occupation of the Georgian territories of South Ossetia and Abkhazia, the 2014 annexation of Crimea, and the continued occupation of and armed conflict in the Donbass region in Ukraine put the effectiveness of Western Deterrence Policy regimes in question. The current version of Russian expansionism in eastern Europe is occurring on the periphery of the EU, making the continent of Europe less secure. This thesis will analyze how the West has created foreign policy, specifically Deterrence Policy, towards Russia in the post-Cold War security environment, why this Deterrence Policy model has failed, and what actions the West, specifically the EU, must undertake in order to create effective Deterrence Policy in the future.

To conduct an effective analysis of the above, this portfolio will first analyze Western foreign and security policy mistakes through a Spiral and Deterrence Model analysis. Next, this portfolio will show how the West found itself in the current security dilemma with Russia due to NATO and US actions. Lastly, this portfolio will discuss a way-ahead for the EU so it can create successful policy towards Russia via the Spiral and Deterrence Models by making necessary changes to its Common Foreign and Security Policy. The result will be recommendations on necessary changes the EU must make in order to become a real, global security actor that can successfully deter Russia from undertaking continued aggressive military actions in Europe's backyard.

¹ The US and NATO and EU member states will be collectively referred to as, "the West" in this thesis portfolio.

The first chapter in this portfolio analyzes the West's historical and current foreign and security policy towards Russia through the lens of structural realism. Kenneth Waltz's security dilemma is used to explain how the West and Russia have interacted since the end of the Cold War. Robert Jervis's theory in *Perceptions and Misperceptions in International Politics* is used to explain how the US ineffectively created policy towards Russia through the Deterrence Model instead of the Spiral Model as a result of our inability to both effectively signal our policies and effectively gauge how Russia would perceive our policies. As a result, Russia reacted via the Spiral Model. This policy battle ultimately leads us to where we are today: an annexed Crimea, an occupation and ongoing conflict in eastern Ukraine, and an occupation and ongoing proxy war in Georgia. Ultimately, the West ineffectively utilized the Deterrence Model when dealing with Russia in the post-Cold War security environment. Because the US did not create policy via the Spiral Model, Russia *perceived* the actions of the West as offensive, and not defensive in nature, and thus responded with escalatory policy choices due to missteps and ineffective signaling by Western policy makers.

The second chapter examines why NATO, and thus the US, has failed in the successful deterrence of Russia. Rapid expansionism into former Soviet Republics and into the former Soviet sphere of influence immediately after the Cold War was perceived as aggressive encirclement. The membership of the Baltic States and the current status of Belarus, Georgia, and Ukraine as Partnership for Peace countries is a severe point of contention. As the de facto leader of NATO due to its position as the global hegemon and the largest contributor of personnel, supplies, and budgetary funds, the US effectively controls NATO policy. Thus, there is a deeply rooted mistrust between the US/NATO

and Russia that effectively precludes any sort of meaningful relationship. NATO's Strategic Concept documents in 1991, 1999, and 2010 show an attempt for the organization to respond to the changing international security environment. NATO's mission evolved from the territorial defense of Europe to executing a range of crisis management operations across the globe. NATO lost its mission focus and is thus unresponsive as an organization. NATO's unwillingness to respond to either the Georgia or Ukraine conflicts proved that the US is the de facto leader of NATO and thus guides its policy choices. The US is unwilling to face Russia head on, and, as such, Europe has no recourse due to a lack of real military power.

The final chapter in this portfolio proposes a way ahead for the West to begin a successful Deterrence Policy regime against Russia. Since NATO, and thus the US, cannot successfully signal meaningful Deterrence Policy correctly due to a historically, deeply rooted mistrust, and since the US and NATO are unwilling to utilize force to response to aggressive Russian military action on Europe's periphery, Europe must act. While NATO and the US are stuck in a security dilemma with Russia, the EU is not. Instead of a security dilemma, the EU and Russia are in an integration dilemma; however, the integration dilemma between Europe and Russia can be solved. Further, Europe and Russia currently cooperate in economic and energy policy, while they are reliant on each other for trade. However, before the EU can become a successful deterrent to Russia, it must first become a real security actor. The EU's CFSP cannot be successful if Europe doesn't first create a meaningful strategic culture that allows for the use of force in both *realpolitik* and Right to Protect (R2P) situations. Lastly, the EU must utilize the European Defense Agency (EDA) to continue to make real progress on pooling and sharing

programs and require an increase in defense spending in an effort to modernize and equip European forces. Without teeth and without political will, the CFSP cannot act as a successful deterrent.

Significance

This portfolio is important because the ineffective post-Cold War security environment Deterrence Regime against Russia has resulted in a real threat to the current security of Europe. Failing to recognize that Russia's current policy regime is fueled by decades of fear and insecurity has resulted in a Deterrence Policy regime full of warnings of threats that merely require Russia to react further with policy created via the spiral model; the security dilemma cannot be escaped. While it cannot be said that this failing western policy regime poses a significant risk to the security of the US homeland, aggressive Russian actions against US military aircraft, ships, and ground troops in the USEUCOM, USAFRICOM, and USCENTCOM areas of operation cannot be understated. These aggressive actions create situations where real, US military versus Russian military actions could take place any day of the week, across multiple theaters of war. Further, a Russian threat to Europe stands to pull the US into a direct conflict with Russia due to NATO Article V requirements. The West cannot afford to continue to put money, manpower, and effort into a failing Deterrence Policy regime that continues to entrench all parties in a security dilemma.

Theoretical Framework

In chapters one and two of this thesis portfolio, a Neorealist framework is used to examine the effectiveness of the West's Deterrence Policy model, while the Liberal-Internationalist worldview on which this Deterrence Policy Model was built is critiqued.

The recommendations presented in chapter three are the culmination of this thesis portfolio. These recommendations are compiled via a Neorealist lens of the EU. This lens views the EU not as a supranational entity, but as a group of strong nation-states that operate as an intergovernmental entity. As such, this entity will be dominated by the strongest member states. A deeper look into the theory on which my recommendations are built is necessary in order to understand how the EU must act in the future in order to conduct hard balancing against Russia in the Neorealist framework. The conclusion of this thesis portfolio will also discuss how Brexit may alter the actions of the strongest EU nation states, Germany and France, in the near future, and how this may affect whether or not the recommendations of this thesis are feasible within the confines of the current EU political climate.

The Realist Paradigm and the Neorealist Framework

The neorealist framework within the greater realist paradigm in international relations rests on the assumption that the anarchic nature of the international system itself can either lead to security cooperation or conflict. This differs from classical realism, fathered by Hans Morgenthau, which focuses on human nature as the origin of the anarchic international system. For classical realism, the international system is defined by the very character of the participants, while neorealism assumes that the structure of the international system is anarchic in nature.

Neorealism operates under two primary key assumptions. First, as previously stated, the international system is anarchic. For this reason, states must operate under the guise of self-help in order to establish their security from other states. Thus, the anarchic structure of the international system *often* results in conflict. Second, states are the

primary actor in the international system. These assumptions lead to several propositions about the international system. First, there will be pervasive security competition in a self-help system due to the self-interest of great powers. Second, security is the primary concern for states. Third, states are focused on relative gains, which is to say that states are concerned with their position in the international system relative to their closest competitors. Fourth, states seek to shape their external environment as a means with which to enhance relative gains while minimizing relative cost. Lastly, states will have “second order” concerns, such as the environment and humanitarian issues, but these concerns rank below the security of the state.

Within the framework of neorealism, there are two distinct camps that agree on the anarchic nature of the international system yet disagree on what the end result of this system will be. First, offensive realism, fathered by John Mearsheimer, assumes that the anarchic nature of the international system will inevitably lead to conflict. Thus, in offensive realism, security is a scarce commodity. He stated, “...great powers fear each other. They regard each other with suspicion, and they worry that war might be in the offing. They anticipate danger. There is little room for trust among states.”² Thus, competition among great powers will lead to conflict because a state will take offensive position against its rivals. Offensive realism is based on worst case assumptions, thus, there is a direct and positive correlation between security and power.³ Because offensive realism works from worst case assumptions, there is technically no security dilemma present within this strand of neorealism, as there is no downside or inadvertent conflict

² John Mearsheimer, *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics* (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 2001), 35-36.

³ Eric J. Hamilton and Brian C. Rathburn, “Scarce differences: Toward a Material and Systemic Foundation for Offensive and Defensive Realism,” *Security Studies* 22 (2013): 443.

due to unknown intentions. Thus, states are fearful from certainty in offensive realism, and not uncertainty.⁴

On the other side of the neorealist framework are the defensive realists, led by founding neorealist scholar, Kenneth Waltz. For defensive realists, security is not scarce, but abundant. Security and power are not directly related, while too much power can cause insecurity.⁵ Thus, instead of maximizing relative power, as in offensive realism, in defensive realism states seek to maximize relative security, which often results in what has been called the “security dilemma.”⁶ The security dilemma refers to a state’s constant need to maximize its security relative to other states, thus leading to other states to do the same. This may lead to an arms race, or to war, due to the uncertainty inherent in the international system. However, defensive realists do believe that states can mitigate security dilemmas with the effective signaling of benign intentions. For example, state “A” clearly signals to state “B” that it is installing a new anti-ballistic missile system because state “B” recently developed a new ballistic missile that has the capability to impact a strategic military facility or population center of state “A.” Thus, state “A” signals that this anti-ballistic missile system is defensive, and not offensive, in nature. Because states seek to increase their relative security, and not relative power, states often seek to maintain the status quo and to avoid war.⁷ Further, in order to maximize relative security, states often seek to balance. A state may balance another state internally by conducting a military build-up, which is referred to as hard balancing. A state may

⁴ Eric J. Hamilton and Brian C. Rathburn, “Scarce differences: Toward a Material and Systemic Foundation for Offensive and Defensive Realism,” *Security Studies* 22 (2013): 447.

⁵ *Ibid.*, 437.

⁶ Kenneth Waltz, *Man and the State of War* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2001), 160.

⁷ Robert Jervis, *Perception and Misperception in International Politics* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976), 90-91.

balance externally by forming alliances with other states to gain leverage. Soft balancing is a form of external balancing that occurs when a state utilizes economic power or diplomatic power to constrain another state.⁸

While both the offensive and defensive strands of neorealism agree that anarchy, competition, and insecurity emerge as a result of the structure of the international system, they differ on how they view security and thus, they disagree on the end result of the nature of the international system. While offensive realists view security as scarce, as thus seek to gain as much power as possible, defensive realists view security as abundant, and only seek to maximize their relative security. Where offensive realism finds war inevitable, defensive realism provides several means for states to avoid war and to simply maintain the status quo.

European Integration: A Neorealist Approach

The Liberal and Constructivist paradigms of international relations have dominated the discourse on the progression of the European project since the end of the Cold War. The EU's utilization of "soft power" as both its primary "carrot" and "stick," has led to the belief that a new era of international order, focused on institutions and normative ideals, has come to fruition. It has been argued that the creation of the EU as a "post-Westphalian" society triggered the end of the Realist paradigm, as it is wholly unable to account for a supranational entity within the confines of its state-focused, anarchical international environment. However, these scholars are wrong, as Neorealists are able to come to terms with the EU as an international actor and its CFSP as both legitimate and relevant.

⁸ Adrian Hyde-Price, "'Normative' Power Europe: A Realist Critique," *Journal of European Public Policy* 13, no. 2 (2006): 223-224.

The structural distribution of power in the international system influences state behavior. Great powers experience three main options for action in the international environment: balancing, buck passing, and bandwagoning. Concerning the EU, member states may seek to use the EU to balance against other great powers, such as the US, China, or Russia. EU member states may also seek to increase their relative gains against the US by allowing the US to take the lead in regional conflicts that are sure to cost substantial blood and treasure, such as conflicts within the Middle East, which is referred to as buck passing. Lastly, EU member states may seek to align with the strongest power in the system in order to gain influence- this is referred to as bandwagoning.⁹

Neorealism can explain the origins and the development of the EU's CFSP in the post-Cold War security environment. While Europe was embroiled in a multipolar environment, there was a near constant struggle for relative gains and a balance of power. After World War II, the international environment suddenly became bipolar and Europe found itself as a security consumer within the confines of the Cold War. Thus, within Europe, security competition ended and cooperation to achieve "milieu goals" ensued because Europe was now free to redefine itself and to invest in "welfare over warfare" with the guaranteed security of NATO.¹⁰ This bipolar structure of power enabled Europe to focus on rebuilding itself as a stable economic entity, supported Franco-German rapprochement, and removed the causes of pre-war nationalism. Thus, the US enabled the permissive environment which, in turn, enabled Europe to begin the European project. Thus, in contrast to Liberal claims, the European project was not the origin of a "new" type of power, or a sign that international politics had changed. Rather, the European

⁹ Adrian Hyde-Price, "Normative 'Power Europe: A Realist Critique,'" *Journal of European Public Policy* 13, no. 2 (2006): 223-224.

¹⁰ Ibid., 225.

project should be seen as a vehicle with which Europe uses to facilitate cooperation on a number of second order issues. During this time, the most powerful EU member states utilized the EU to shape its near abroad in ways amenable to the long term strategic economic interests of its member states. Thus, the EU is an instrument of collective hegemony, shaping its external milieu through power in a variety of forms.

However, the unipolarity reflective of the post-Cold War security environment allowed the US, as global hegemon, to pursue its foreign policy unilaterally, if it so chose. The terrorist attacks of September 11th, 2001 moved the US to focus less on Europe, and more on areas such as the Middle East and Africa. Further, its hope to “pivot to Asia,” took the US away from Europe even more.¹¹ As such, the EU has found the US to be unreliable when it needed “hard power” in its region in recent years. For this reason, the EU started to pursue a more coherent security policy that would allow it to act in regions where the US did not wish to exert any effort.

Now that we have discussed the external factors that allowed the EU to start the European project, and that pushed the EU to begin thinking about security, we will now turn to the internal pressures that allowed the EU to achieve cooperation among member states. The EU can be described as a balanced multipolar system. While Europe was unbalanced for most of its pre-Cold War history, modern Europe can be defined as balanced. Europe can be defined as having four major powers: the US, France, Germany, and Russia. While Germany is the most economically powerful member state, France possesses the strongest military arsenal and the boldest foreign policy, thus neither France nor Germany can make a bid for regional hegemony. In the shadow of this

¹¹ Jolyon Howorth and John T.S. Keeler, “The EU, NATO, and the Quest for European Autonomy,” in *Defending Europe: The EU, NATO, and the Quest for European Autonomy*, ed. Jolyon Howorth and John T.S. Keeler (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003), 12-13.

balanced multipolarity, security competition in Europe remains muted.¹² No power can make a credible bid for hegemony, thus the focus on relative gains is less pronounced which allows for cooperation.

An important principle in Neorealism is balancing. According to Waltz, states balance against any concentration of power in the international system.¹³ Thus, the EU can be also seen as the attempt of European states to balance, both externally and internally. As second ranked states, European states are able to engage in hard balancing against the dominant power, or perceived dominant power(s). Thus, the EU is a hard-balancing tool for European states in the international system. Further, states within the EU utilize the EU to balance against each other. As previously mentioned, France can balance Germany's economic might with military might, while smaller European states can band together for a deeper voice within the EU itself. Through alliances and security institutions, states can enhance their security and improve their ability to project power abroad, making relative gains against their rival.

While the European states may not necessarily fear for their survival relative to US power, they are motivated by the extreme concentration of military might in the US. With the CSDP, the EU can narrow the gap between military capabilities for a few distinctly European reasons. First, the EU has now become acutely accustomed to being "left in the lurch" by the US when it comes to conflict on its periphery. The US cannot always be bothered to intervene on Europe's behalf, while Europe does not always appreciate how the US intervenes, when it chooses to do so. In the case of both Bosnia and Kosovo, the EU did not approve of US airstrikes, which have a higher risk of

¹² Adrian Hyde-Price, "Normative 'Power Europe: A Realist Critique,'" *Journal of European Public Policy* 13, no. 2 (2006): 230.

¹³ Kenneth Waltz, *Man and the State of War* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2001), 160.

incurring collateral damage than traditional ground conflict. Second, a deeper hard power capability enables the EU to promote its economic interests abroad. Third, a deeper hard power capability will allow the EU to gain leverage over the US on global security issues, and to have a bigger say. Lastly, the CSDP can be utilized as a classic hard balancing tool against any predatory behavior on part of the US in the future.¹⁴

It is most important to recognize that the Neorealist interpretation of the EU does not focus on the supranational entity as an actor. Rather, the CFSP is driven by the most powerful EU member states and remains an intergovernmental experience. National governments utilize and shape the CSDP to advance their national interests, while defense capabilities remain national. There is no common European army with which the EU wages war. The CFSP is an instrument of collective coercive diplomacy and military crisis management tool.¹⁵ It collectively shapes the EU's external milieu, using military coercion to back up its diplomacy.¹⁶ The failure of "soft power" to bring about an acceptable end to the conflicts of the 1990's, paired with the dynamics of a unipolar world and a multipolar Europe, provided the external and internal stimuli required for the EU to pursue a "hard power" capability. However, the atmosphere of cooperation provided by the US does not suddenly mean the anarchic world order disappears. EU member states still jealously guard their sovereignty and pursue their own foreign policy priorities. However, they can cooperate on second order concerns. Multipolarity will limit the scope and ambition of the CFSP. Further, the CFSP will be driven by the most powerful member states. These member states may, on a variety of issues, decide to levy

¹⁴ Michael Merlingen, *EU Security Policy* (Lynne Rienner Publishers: Boulder, 2012), 15.

¹⁵ Jolyon Howorth, *Security and Defense Policy in the EU* (England: Palgrave MacMillan, 2014), 17.

¹⁶ Adrian Hyde-Price, "'Normative' Power Europe: A Realist Critique," *Journal of European Public Policy* 13, no. 2 (2006): 230.

different strategies at the US, whether it be bandwagoning, buck passing, or balancing. Thus, the CFSP will be influenced by both the current unipolar system international system and by Europe's multipolar system. The conclusion of this portfolio will discuss the implications the Neorealist framework on the recommendations of chapter 3.

Liberalism and Aggressive Expansionism

While the aforementioned section describes in great detail the theoretical framework for this portfolio, it is important to examine the alternate view. As previously discussed, the rapid expansion of both NATO and the EU after the end of the Cold War was a result of the desire to expand the liberal norms and values of the west to states in the former Soviet backyard. To liberal-internationalists, the expansion of Western political and military alliances was a way in which to make the world safer than it had been before, as Democratic nations are typically less aggressive than non-democratic nations, in accordance with Kant's democratic peace theory.¹⁷ However, this liberal-internationalist worldview is actually responsible for doing the opposite. Because liberalism does not take into account the actual structure of the international system: anarchy, competition, and insecurity.

The liberalist Clinton administration favored enlargement, and sought to promote economic and political interdependence in Europe and supported the creation of international, liberal institutions. To liberalists, the end of the Cold War signaled a new world order, where the US was now a benign hegemon that could not be seen as aggressive to Russia. This portfolio argues that this liberal-internationalist worldview is actually responsible for creating aggressive expansion policies of both NATO and the

¹⁷ John Mearsheimer, "Why the Ukraine Crisis is the West's Fault," *Foreign Affairs*, September/October 2014, 7.

EU, which effectively encircled Russia and resulted in Russian foreign policy via the Spiral Model.

Thesis Roadmap

The West must engage Russia differently. The first chapter in this portfolio, *“Effects of the Deterrence and Spiral Models: Russia and the US in the Post-Cold War Security Environment,”* concludes that the West’s Deterrence Policy towards Russia failed due to the West utilizing policy created via the Deterrence Policy Model when it should have been creating policy via the Spiral Model. What’s more, the West ineffectively signaled its foreign policy, causing Russia to *perceive* the actions of the West as offensive, and not defensive in nature. Thus, Russia responded with policy choices through the Spiral Model for three reasons. First, Russian misperceptions of the West’s policy choices through the Deterrence Model are firmly rooted in the insecurity within the greater Russian psyche as a result of its tumultuous history with geography and geopolitics. Second, the Centrist politics of Mr. Putin call for Russia to be a regional leader and a “historical other” on the international stage, immune from Western criticisms of its economy or governance, which makes expansionism into former Soviet Republics with large Russian populations a valid and moral option in the face of Western expansionism. Lastly, Russia’s work to create a regional sphere of influence in Eurasia to rival the military, political, and economic power of both NATO and the EU is a defensive reaction to the West’s Deterrence Model, making any move to expand either NATO or the EU an offensive action.

The second chapter in this portfolio, *“NATO: The State of the Trans-Atlantic Alliance in Light of the New Russian Threat,”* works to answer a question seemingly

posed by the first: can NATO, and thus the US, overcome its current security dilemma with Russia and create successful Deterrence Policy towards Russia in the future? I conclude that the answer is no. NATO, as a military alliance, has proven itself valuable, but has also proven unwilling to address European territorial integrity concerns such as illegal assertions of Russian aggression due to the current burden sharing arrangement. US influence on NATO makes the alliance unwilling to directly address Russia with force due to a seemingly insignificant (to the US) annexation of Crimea or Georgian territories. The political end of the alliance faltered with its rapid expansionism, which ultimately led to the resurgent Russian threat. Further, unsuccessful attempts, since the alliance's inception, at forcing Europe to share the burden of financing NATO also failed. The implications of a disproportionate burden sharing alliance places decision making power firmly in the hands of the entity making the largest contribution. Thus, the US successfully controls decision making in the alliance, even though the alliance deals mostly with European conditions.

The last chapter, "*The EU: A Common Foreign and Security Policy to Effectively Deter the Russian Threat*," concludes that the EU is the best and only possible deterrent to aggressive Russian foreign policy and military action. This chapter is based on chapter two's findings that NATO, and thus the US, will not be able to escape the current security dilemma with Russia. This chapter finds that the integration dilemma between the EU and Russia can be escaped with actions on the part of the EU, while the EU and Russia are best suited to work together due to shared territorial boundaries, wanted territorial "buffer zones," and trade and energy interdependence. This chapter concludes with required actions that the EU must take in order to become a security actor on the global

stage and to have a functioning CFSP. While creating policy via the Spiral Model instead of the Deterrence model should result in less aggressive Russian foreign policy and military action, Russia must still view the EU as a valid security actor on the international stage to take its policies seriously.

This portfolio will conclude with a review of the key findings from each chapter and then examine the feasibility of the recommendations in chapter three, given the current political climate in both the EU and in the US. The significant work that will need to be taken by the EU cannot be overstated. Generations of Europeans are accustomed to being consumers of security, and not active participants. Further, rising tensions with China in the East and South China Sea and the continued “pivot to Asia,” will likely prevent the US, and thus NATO, from engaging militarily on seemingly “European” problems that Europeans themselves seems unwilling to face. Europe must act to shake off the decades-old label as a “military worm,” and begin to build to capacity to use both hard and soft power on the global stage in order to fend off the current Russian threat.

This capacity will enable the US to conduct offshore balancing, a Neorealist action that would allow Europe to finally take the reins of its own defense and allow to US to release itself from this burden and focus elsewhere. In this scenario, the EU would take on most of the burden for deterring Russian as a regional power with its CFSP, allowing the US to free itself of the significant financial burden that comes with underwriting all of Europe’s security requirements. While the CFSP will not be able to transform into a US-type large-scale expeditionary military capability due to the limits of European political will, this will allow the US to retain a significant level of political influence in Europe as a result of a lingering reliance on the US for large-scale military

operations. It is important to note that offshore balancing is not isolationism, and that the US would still be committed to intervening in Europe, in the event that the regional balance of power had broken down.

Chapter One

Effects of the Deterrence and Spiral Models: Russia and the US in the Post-Cold War Security Environment

The Post-Cold War security environment contains different dynamics to different International Relations experts. To some, the Cold War effectively stripped Russia of its great power status due to its incredible loss of territory and economic might, leaving Russia a declining great power with a one-dimensional economy. To others, Russia emerged as a neo-imperial, burgeoning superpower, aggressive and hungry to regain the glory and territory of the former Tsarist and Soviet epochs. However, the Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2014, leading to the subsequent annexation of Crimea, proved that Russia is, in fact, not simply a fallen power willing to accept its fate in the background of the international order.

The current international security environment is the direct result of the actions of the West during the post-Cold War time period. After the dissolution of the Soviet Union, both NATO and the EU expanded to Russia's westernmost borders and integrated many former Soviet Republics as member states. More than just the expansion of political and economic alliances, the US maintained its Cold War military footprint throughout Europe, with strategically placed forces, supplies, and weapons systems. Due to these actions, the West and Russia, once again, found themselves in a Security Dilemma. Thus, an examination of the West's incorrect use of the Deterrence Model to formulate policy is necessary in order to identify policy choices that will lead to a resolution of the present Security Dilemma.

This thesis will argue that the West ineffectively utilized the Deterrence Model instead of the Spiral Model when dealing with Russia in the post-Cold War security environment. Further, Russia *perceived* these policy actions of the West as offensive, and not defensive in nature, and thus responded with policy choices via the Spiral Model for three reasons. First, Russian misperceptions of the West's policy choices through the Deterrence Model are firmly rooted in the insecurity within the greater Russian psyche as a result of its tumultuous history with geography and geopolitics. Second, the Centrist politics of Mr. Putin call for Russia to be a regional leader and a "historical other" on the international stage, immune from Western criticisms of its economy or governance, which makes expansionism into former Soviet Republics with large Russian populations a valid and moral option in the face of Western expansionism. Lastly, Russia's work to create a regional sphere of influence in Eurasia to rival the military, political, and economic power of both NATO and the EU is a defensive reaction to the Western policy formulated via the Deterrence Model, making any move to expand either NATO or the EU an offensive action. While small and relatively lacking in political, economic, and military clout, the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), the Eurasian Economic Union (EEU), and the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) have the potential to transform into a functional Eurasian community. Ultimately, geopolitics, the Centrist political philosophy of Mr. Putin, and a growing Eurasian community uniquely positioned Russia to respond aggressively to unsavvy policy choices created by the West through the Deterrence Model.

The West's use of the Deterrence Model, while Russia responded via the Spiral Model, perpetuated the current post-Cold War Security Dilemma and ultimately resulted

in Russian expansion into both Georgia and Crimea. Further, these Russian misperceptions of the West's policy choices have led to an aggressive Russian foreign policy that may lead to further expansion in the future and a continued push for a Russian sphere of influence to rival that of NATO and the EU in decades to come.

The Security Dilemma

At the heart of the realist theory of international relations lies the Security Dilemma. According to structural realism, power is the most important factor in international relations.^{18 19} Largely developed by structural realist Kenneth Waltz in *Man and the State of War*, the theory postulates that the anarchic nature of the international system results in states acting in accordance with their own self-help, meaning states act in their own interest. Since survival is the ultimate goal, states will develop offensive military capabilities in order to further their own interests and to increase their own power. Because of the anarchic system, states cannot be sure of the intentions of other states, and thus do not wish to lose power relative to other states.

The lack of trust, based on the inherent uncertainty of an anarchic system, results in the Security Dilemma: a situation where a state increases its power by either making alliances or increasing brute military strength, leading other states to do the same, even when no state may desire actual conflict.²⁰ John Hertz, attributed as the originator of the security dilemma theory, stated in his landmark piece, "Internationalist Idealism and the Security Dilemma," that, "Nationalities inevitably became competing units after

¹⁸ Kenneth Waltz, *Man and the State of War* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2001), 160.

¹⁹ In contrast to classical realist thought, as developed by Hans Morgenthau, where the behavior of states is explained largely by human nature and not the structure of the international order.

²⁰ John Mearsheimer, *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics* (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 2001), 35-36.

abandoning their state of innocence and establishing themselves as nation-states.”²¹

Thus, the Security Dilemma is an inevitable state of the international security environment, and thus nation-states must develop meaningful frameworks, or models, with which to solve these dilemmas as they arise.

Models of War and Peace

As the Security Dilemma is founded upon differing perceptions of other states' intentions, two models of decision making in international relations theory exist. A Security Dilemma can either result in cooperation between states, or in the rational use of conflict. Both the Spiral and Deterrence Models involve misunderstandings and intentions on the side of each nation-state in the Security Dilemma, yet completely different policy choices flow from each model.

Carefully examined by Robert Jervis in *Perception and Misperception in International Politics*, the Spiral Model is the ultimate “action-reaction” dynamic that can result from the security dilemma.²² When a state's offensive weapons do not match the defensive weapons of an adversarial state, they react and obtain offensive weapons greater than the defensive weapons of the adversarial state. The other state responds, and so on. In the end, each state involved is less secure than they were in the beginning. Uncertainty thus triggers an overreaction. The Spiral Model is rooted in the fact that the misplaced certainty that an adversarial state's weapons are for offensive, and not defensive, purposes.²³ That is to say, it is much easier to attribute an adversary's

²¹ John Hertz, “Idealist Internationalism and the Security Dilemma,” *World Politics* 2, no. 2 (1950): 163.

²² Randall Schweller, “Jervis's Realism” in *Psychology, Strategy, and Conflict: Perceptions of Insecurity in International Relations Theory*, ed. James W. Davis (New York: Routledge, 2013), 37-38.

²³ Andrew Kydd, “Game Theory and the Spiral Model,” *World Politics* 49, no. 3 (1997): 372.

unwanted actions to dispositional factors versus situational factors.²⁴ States attribute their own arms build-ups as appropriate defensive responses to the external environment and expect others to view their actions the same, while they view the actions of others as a clear indication of aggressive intent.

Thus, the Spiral Model is based on a misplaced certainty that an adversary state intends to do you harm, and contains the misperception that punishment will elicit good behavior.²⁵ Ultimately, the Spiral Model applies when the rival state is motivated by fear or uncertainty. This model posits that conflicts arise from punishment applied in the false expectation that it will elicit better behavior from the other side, when in fact it elicits even worse behavior. The other side is often emboldened by the actions and adopts wider aims or becomes more willing to use force. Thus, two sides, perhaps only divided by minor differences, spiral into an intense confrontation in either an arms race or all-out war. Thus, the Spiral Model shows that peace is best preserved by diplomacy and reconciliation, vice using the stick.²⁶

In contrast, the Deterrence Model is rooted in the belief that war results from situations where acts of appeasement are made in the false expectation that it will elicit good behavior from an adversarial state.²⁷ As explained by Jervis in *Perception and Misperception in International Politics*, the appeased state will believe it frightened the appeasing state into making concessions and will thus continue the frightening behavior which will ultimately result in war. Two misperceptions exist in this model. First, the

²⁴ Randall Schweller, "Jervis's Realism" in *Psychology, Strategy, and Conflict: Perceptions of Insecurity in International Relations Theory*, ed. James W. Davis (New York: Routledge, 2013), 38.

²⁵ *Ibid.*, 39.

²⁶ Robert Jervis, *Perception and Misperception in International Politics* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976), 90-91.

²⁷ *Ibid.*, 58-59.

appeasing state believes that the appeased state will concede after the concessions. Second, the appeased state believes that the appeasing state won't carry out threat because they have already made concessions.²⁸ If the state is an aggressor and not a status quo power, it will infer weakness from concessions. Further, if the other state has illegitimate claims and still receives concessions, it will also infer weakness. Thus, giving concessions to aggressive, strong states with illegitimate claims is not preferred. Concessions to weaker, status-quo states with legitimate claims is safer, and will likely deter further bad behavior.²⁹ Thus, deterrence theorists believe that states defending the status quo must use threats and unyielding policies when deterring aggressors with illegitimate claims.

Perceptions and Signaling in the Security Dilemma

There is more to formulating policy when stuck in a Security Dilemma than just selecting one model over another. A nation-state must critically examine how the receiving nation-state will perceive their actions. Jervis' understanding of realism focused on individual uncertainty as a result of cognitive limitations and motivated biases. He stated, "If he is to decide intelligently how to act, a person must predict how others will behave. If he seeks to influence them, he needs to estimate how they will react to the alternative policies he can adopt."³⁰ That is to say, individual predispositions of world leaders may affect their behavior and decisions on the international stage. On Jervis, McDermott stated, "Jervis's work was always unified in part by his attempt to understand

²⁸ Randall Schweller, "Jervis's Realism" in *Psychology, Strategy, and Conflict: Perceptions of Insecurity in International Relations Theory*, ed. James W. Davis (New York: Routledge, 2013), 39-40.

²⁹ Robert Jervis, "Cooperation under the Security Dilemma" *World Politics* 30, no. 2 (1978): 179-180.

³⁰ *Ibid.*, 32.

how people make sense of the world they inhabit, and how and why they become motivated to act as they do.”³¹

Moving past perceptions and misperceptions, Jervis believed that actors must signal their intentions appropriately to other actors within the international system. A signal can be defined as an attempt at persuasion. For a signal to be successful, the receiver of the signal must accept the sender’s meaning of that signal.³² No matter how obvious a signal means to the sender, the receiver may either not understand or may understand a different signal altogether. Jervis likens the issues with signaling to someone who is humming a song to themselves. While the hummer may understand perfectly the song he is humming, it is not for certain that another person will recognize the song that the hummer is humming at all. Thus, one must understand both signals and inference, for a signaler must understand what the receiver of the signal will infer from the signal. Furthermore, a person’s beliefs can influence their inferences, which is an important aspect of the signaling process for the signaling nation-state to bear in mind.³³

In terms of the post-Cold War Security Dilemma between Russia and the United States, the US utilized the Deterrence Model to formulate its Russian foreign policy, when post-Soviet Russia’s foreign policy was motivated by fear and insecurity. Thus, the US should have formulated policy via the Spiral Model, and not the Deterrence Model. Russia, in turn, utilized the Spiral Model to formulate its foreign policy, as Russia perceived the actions of the US to be offensive, and not defensive in nature. The US did not take into account, or simply miscalculated, how Russia would receive their signaling.

³¹ Rose McDermott, “Political Psychology,” in *Psychology, Strategy, and Conflict*, ed. James W. Davis (Routledge, London, 2013), 47.

³² Jonathan Mercer, “Rational Signaling Revisited,” in *Psychology, Strategy, and Conflict*, ed. James W. Davis (Routledge, London, 2013), 70.

³³ *Ibid.*, 75.

This “action-reaction” dynamic of the current security dilemma is a result of the US making situational attributions to explain for its own disagreeable behavior while making dispositional attributions to explain for Russia’s disagreeable behavior.

Western Expansionism and the Deterrence Model

In an analysis of the West’s use of the Deterrence Model during the Cold War, many scholars end with the fall of the Berlin Wall. However, the West utilized the Deterrence Model long after the Soviet Empire collapsed in 1989. Once the Soviet Empire collapsed politically, economically, and territorially, the US and its Western allies began a series of moves to deter the failed state from seeking great power status again in the near future. The policy outcomes from the West’s use of the Deterrence Model can be described as the expansion of both NATO and the EU, and the continued presence of the United States’ military apparatus in Europe.

NATO Expansion

Since the end of the Cold War, NATO moved past the “simple” concept of a trans-Atlantic alliance against a singular, external threat, and shifted toward a modern security agenda with out-of-area adversaries. However, in the midst of moving toward a more global approach, NATO undertook a large expansionist project in an effort to create the largest, most powerful trans-Atlantic alliance possible. After the Cold War, NATO developed an “open door” policy in an effort to spread democracy, security, and stability further across Europe. Russia points to this expansionist policy as “encirclement,” meant to use NATO as a Western political and military tool to influence Russian’s neighbors to turn West, and not East.³⁴

³⁴ J.L. Black, *Russia Faces NATO Expansion* (Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield, 2000): 11.

Under the Clinton Administration in 1999, NATO expanded to include Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic. Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia followed in 2004, while Bosnia and Macedonia received Membership Action Plans (MAP) in 2011.³⁵ In 2008, both Georgia and Ukraine entered into “intensive dialogues” with NATO, a preliminary stage before a MAP, yet neither nation has been given a MAP due to the severe complications posed by the Russian annexation of the Georgian territories of South Ossetia and Abkhazia in 2008, and the Russian annexation of Crimea in 2014. Russia viewed the 2008 MAP talks a concerted effort to move Georgia and Ukraine out of the Russian sphere of influence and into the Western orbit.³⁶ Thus, the following 2008 actions of Russia in Georgia should have been no surprise to Western policy makers; the expansion of NATO into former Soviet Republics is an action formulated via the Spiral Model and Russia responded in turn.

The break-up of the Soviet Union left sizeable ethnic Russian populations in many states across Central and Eastern Europe. Historically, these populations faced discrimination and mistreatment from “democratic” governments in the Baltic States, the Caucasus, and both Central and Eastern Europe. Thus, Russia has legitimate geo-strategic concerns in both Central and Eastern Europe and its aggressive foreign policy in the area should not be a surprise.³⁷ NATO expansion in and of itself implies that Russia is a constant threat to the trans-Atlantic alliance. Even liberal-minded Soviet premiers such as Boris Yeltsin condemned NATO’s post-Cold War expansion as “hawkish.” NATO’s expansionism effectively led to an agreement among Russian elites that the Alliance

³⁵ Brian J Collins, *NATO: A Guide to the Issues* (Santa Barbara: Praeger, 2011), 126-127.

³⁶ Ibid.

³⁷ Michael Clarke, “NATO Expansion: A Policy Error of Historic Importance,” *International Affairs* 84, no. 6 (2008): 1286.

violated “accepted rules” under which the Cold War had ended. In an effort to consolidate power, NATO did not take into consideration the consequences that enlargement into previously Soviet space would have on any future relationship with Russia.³⁸

More than just its expansion, specific NATO actions can also be isolated as factors in the current Security Dilemma, most notably, the execution of Operation Allied Force in 1999. At this period in time, NATO-Russian relations were executed via NATO’s Permanent Joint Council (PJC). The PJC gave Russia a unique status as a non-member, but did not give Russia a real say in NATO decision making, it simply allowed them a voice.³⁹ During the lead up to Operation Allied Force, Russia urged NATO via the PJC to stay out of the Balkan conflict as Serbia was an important Russian ally. Not only did the US not seek a United Nation’s Security Council Resolution on Operation Allied Force, it disregarded then President Boris Yeltsin’s warning in the PJC to not interfere in Russia’s “near abroad,” effectively silencing Russia’s voice in the only two real international institutions it was a member of. After the 1995 bombings of Bosnia Serbs, Yeltsin said, This is a first sign of what could happen when NATO comes right up to the Russian Federation’s borders...”⁴⁰ In 1999, NATO shot down several Serbian aircraft and executed full air strikes against Serbian forces.⁴¹ It is widely regarded that the humiliation of Moscow after Operation Allied Force resulted in the resignation of President Yeltsin. To add insult to injury, both NATO and the US recognized the break-away region of Kosovo as a nation almost immediately, a bold move in the face of both

³⁸ J.L. Black, *Russia Faces NATO Expansion* (Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield, 2000): 7.

³⁹ Brian J Collins, *NATO: A Guide to the Issues* (Santa Barbara: Praeger, 2011), 94.

⁴⁰ John J. Mearsheimer, “Why the Ukraine Crisis is the West’s Fault,” *Foreign Affairs*, September/October 2014.

⁴¹ Ibid.

Russia and Serbia. Mr. Putin referenced this action when he recognized the pro-Russian breakaway territories of Abkhazia and South Ossetia as nation-states in 2008.

EU Expansion

The expansion of the EU in the post-Cold War security environment was yet another policy outcome of the West's improper use of the Deterrence Model. While the expansion of NATO ensured security cooperation against the former Soviet Empire, the EU represented a possible philosophic shift in the governing and economic theories of former Soviet Republics.

The integration of former Soviet Republics into the "West" signified a realignment away from the former Soviet Empire and her economic and political philosophies, and towards Western ideals of free market capitalism and democracy. In the largest expansion in EU history, former Soviet Republics were welcomed en masse in 2004. The Czech Republic, Slovakia, Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, Hungary, Poland, and Slovenia all became full EU member states in 2004, while Romania and Bulgaria followed in 2007. Moldova, Ukraine, and Georgia signed Association Agreements in 2014, with the understanding of future membership at an undisclosed date.⁴² It is not expected that Georgia or Ukraine will become member states of the EU, for the same reasons the nations have not yet received a NATO MAP.

This expansion of the EU signified an unapologetic realignment of the European and Eurasian political sphere in favor of the West, and along with it, its political and economic philosophies. Not only did former Soviet States realign with the West, they gave up some national power to the supranational body of the EU in order to gain

⁴² Stephen F. Larrabee, "Danger and Opportunity in Eastern Europe," *Foreign Affairs* 85, no. 6 (2006): 119.

independence from Russia.⁴³ More than just a philosophical realignment, non-EU member states, such as Ukraine, Moldova, and many Western Balkan states, were now territorial EU neighbors.⁴⁴ The buffer zone between the West and the former Soviet Empire became a thing of the past.

US Military Presence

Aside from the political and economic expansion of the West further into the former Soviet Empire via both NATO and the EU, the US maintained its military presence in Europe after the Cold War. While it is true that the US significantly drew down the number of American troops in Europe since the end of the Cold War, it maintained a targeted presence of forces, equipment, and weapons systems.

US European Command (USEUCOM) is comprised of approximately 65,000 American service members from the Army, Air Force, Marine Corps, and Navy. The Army maintains roughly two Brigade Combat Teams (BCT) in Europe, with approximately 8,000 soldiers ready for tasking between the two BCTs in Vilseck, Germany. The Army also operates a BCT out of Kosovo in partnership with NATO and maintains several other commands throughout Germany.⁴⁵ The Marine Corps maintains a Special Purpose Marine Air Ground Task Force in Europe, the Black Sea Rotational Force (BSRF). BSRF is located in Romania, with roughly 500 Marines ready for tasking.⁴⁶ The Air Force operates its European Command out of Ramstein Air Force Base in Germany, but also conducts significant operations in England. The Air Force has

⁴³ Joan De Bardeleben, "The Impact of EU Enlargement on the EU-Russian Relationship," in *A Resurgent Russia and the West: The EU, NATO, and Beyond*, ed. Roger Kanet (Dordrecht: Republic of Letters Publishing, 2009): 93.

⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, 93.

⁴⁵ "Units and Commands," *US Army Forces Europe*, <http://www.eur.army.mil/organization/units.htm>.

⁴⁶ US European Command, "European Reassurance Initiative Fact Sheet" (USEUCOM Public Affairs Office, 2017).

roughly 10 Air Wings ready for tasking throughout Europe. The Air Force contributes most notably to the NATO Baltic Air Policing Mission, which enables the Baltic States to maintain air superiority and early warning capabilities in the face of an aggressive Russian air force. The policing mission is now expanding to both Poland and Romania.⁴⁷ The Navy operates forward deployed Naval Forces out of Rota, Spain, in support of its Ballistic Missile Defense Mission (BMD). The BMD mission is also linked to a land-based node with Aegis Ashore facilities in both Romania and Poland as a part of the European Phase Adaptive Approach.⁴⁸ The Navy also conducts routine patrols of both the Black Sea and Mediterranean Sea, as well as P-3/P-8 Maritime Reconnaissance missions to monitor the movement of Russian surface ships and submarines from the Baltic Fleet.

After the Russian invasion of Crimea in 2014, NATO instituted the European Reassurance Initiative (ERI) in an effort to reassure its Eastern and Central European member states that the US is committed to the security and territorial integrity of Europe. Funding for the initiative sits at 3.42 billion dollars.⁴⁹ ERI funding enables Operation Atlantic Resolve, which ensures that USEUCOM has appropriate permanent and rotational forces available for tasking as a show of support to European Allies and as a show of force against Russia. Further, Operation Atlantic Resolve supports bilateral and multilateral training exercises with European allies and partners while fostering partnership capacity for new and potential NATO partners. In 2017, the US funded 28

⁴⁷ Paul Belkin, "NATO: Response to the Crisis in Ukraine and Security Concerns in Central and Eastern Europe," (Congressional Research Service, Washington D.C., 2014), 3.

⁴⁸ Andrew Michta, "Dealing with Russia: A New 2020 Vision?" in *The Future of NATO: Regional Defense and Global Security*, eds Andrew Michta and Paal Hilde (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2014), 58-59.

⁴⁹ US European Command, "European Reassurance Initiative Fact Sheet" (USEUCOM Public Affairs Office, 2017).

joint and multinational training exercises, training over 18,000 US military personnel and over 45,000 European allies and partner nation personnel.⁵⁰ Most notably, the increased budget for 2017 allowed for the introduction of the F-35 to the Air Force arsenal in Europe, with the Navy's F-35 introduction to Europe occurring in 2018.

After the end of the Cold War, the West continued with its flawed use of the Deterrence Model in an effort to deter Russia from attempting to achieve great power status in the near future. The expansion of NATO into former Soviet Republics as a political alliance and as a cooperative security institution would ensure a larger proliferation of NATO assets in Central and Eastern Europe, as well as a larger pool of resources should Article V operations be needed against an aggressive Russia in the future. The 2004 and 2007 expansion of the EU to include many former Soviet Republics, as well as the 2014 association agreements, served to philosophically realign former Soviet Republics to Western political and economic theory. In all, the former Soviet Empire lost its buffer zone between itself and Europe, and now had "the West" knocking on its door. The West utilized the Deterrence Model in an effort to provide Russia real threats of the use of force. However, because Russia's foreign policy was developed out of fear and insecurity, Russian responded with policy formulated via the Spiral Model which further escalated the situation. Russia viewed the expansion of NATO, the EU, and the continued military apparatus of the US within Europe as aggressive, offensive actions.

Russia and the Spiral Model

In an effort to gain security and power in the security dilemma, the West aggressively encircled Russia through political, military, and economic alliances in the

⁵⁰ Ibid.

wake of the Soviet collapse. Further, the West positioned offensive and defensive weapons systems and troops across Europe in an effort to further gain security and power, without realizing that Russia would perceive these actions to be offensive in nature. The Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2014 and subsequent annexation of Crimea proved that Russia is willing to respond militarily in order to gain security and power within the construct of the current security dilemma, and thus, the spiral continues.

Jervis' explanation of the importance of cognitive psychology within international relations is wholly relevant to the security dilemma between Russia and the West. The West's mistake came in its failure to recognize how Russia would perceive their actions made via the Deterrence Model. This section will argue that the West failed to predict Russian perceptions of Western policy outcomes in three areas. First, the Russian identity is wholly rooted in its deep insecurity of invasion due to its geography and historical experiences via the chessboard of geopolitics. Second, President Putin's Centrist political philosophy exempts Russia from judgements of the West in the economic and political sphere due to its status as a great "historical other." Lastly, Western foreign policy created through the Deterrence Model has forced Russia to build its own Russian sphere of influence in the greater Eurasian area. Through the CIS, EEU, and CSTO, Russia seeks more political and economic alliances in order to gain more power and security via the Spiral Model. Finally, a case study on Crimea provides a glimpse at the culmination of almost two decades of the Security Dilemma between Russia and the West and provides insight on what may be to come.

Geography and Geopolitics

“Russia’s defining characteristic is indefensibility.” This George Friedman quote, while short and to the point, is perhaps the single most important factor that has defined Russian foreign policy for centuries.⁵¹ Invasions of the Nordic peoples, Eastern Nomadic invasions such as the Tatars, Mongols, and Turks, invasions of Western armies, and violent oppression from their own rulers have led Russian peoples to live harsh lives due to less than optimal geopolitical realities. Russia’s unique geopolitical identity is still the driving factor in its foreign policy today.

The direct impact of geography and geopolitical position is that it determines your territorial neighbors and the dynamics of your regional environment. First, in terms of geography, Russia is a harsh territory. While full of natural resources, the land has a harsh climate and lacks arable land. Unfavorable weather conditions render commercial activity impossible in many areas, hinder the exploitation of resources, and make a sustainable trade network within the country difficult. It lacks rivers, seas, or mountain ranges which provide natural defense measures against aggressive neighbors.⁵² Even as the world’s largest land power which extends halfway across the globe, it lacks direct access to ice-free ports and global trade routes. In order to combat invasions from both the west and east, Russia developed a policy of almost continued expansion in order to conquer invasion. This expansionism allowed for buffers against unfriendly and over aggressive neighbors. Russia has expanded into Central and Eastern Europe to fend off France and Germany, into Afghanistan to fend off the British in India, and into the far

⁵¹ George Friedman, *The Geopolitics of Russia: Permanent Struggle*, Stratfor, October 15, 2008, <http://www.stratfor.com/sample/analysis/geopolitics-russia-permanent-struggle>.

⁵² Robert D. Kaplan, *The Revenge of Geography* (New York: Random House, 2012), 158.

East to fend off China.⁵³ Thus, insecurity can be named as the foundational characteristic of all Russian foreign policy, and a characteristic that has been etched into the minds of all Russian strategic thinkers over hundreds of years.

The West failed to recognize that its policy choices via the Deterrence Model signaled offensive actions to Russia, which, due to a unique history, has a constant fear of invasion and a sincere inferiority complex. This dynamic would require Western policy makers to respond with policy formulated via the Spiral Model. The intersection of this geopolitical fear with a Centrist political philosophy requires Western policy makers to critically analyze the inferences Russian strategists will make from its policy choices—something that has yet to occur.

Vladimir Putin's Centrism

Vladimir Putin is a dynamic political figure who worked to alter the relationship between Russia and the West. Under Mr. Putin, Russia has become increasingly assertive in its foreign policy. This thesis argues that the West consolidated power after the fall of the Soviet Empire by political, economic, and military expansion via the vehicles of both the EU and NATO due to their use of the Deterrence Model. However, under Mr. Putin, these actions were not perceived as acts of deterrence, but as aggressive acts, and thus, Russia believed that the West intended to do it harm. By effectively encircling Russia with both the EU, NATO, and the American military apparatus, the West elicited worse behavior from Russia due to its failure to use the Spiral Model to formulate policy.

Mr. Putin adopted a blended political philosophy, taking its place on the political spectrum somewhere between Westernization and Eurasianism. In this Centrist political philosophy, Russian elites recognize the positive attributes of the Western democratic and

⁵³ Ibid.

economic order, while attributing to Russia a great power role within the international community with its own unique way of doing things.⁵⁴ Russian political history, from hundreds of years of Mongol-Turkic Horde rule, Tsarist rule, socialism, and the break-up of a communist political experiment, had a significant impact on the political character of the nation today.⁵⁵ Russia has always been torn between nostalgia for its past and a yearning towards Western culture. Peter the Great was greatly inspired by the West in the seventeenth century and aspired to achieve the Western level of civilization. Ever since then, the West has been imbedded in the Russian psyche as setting the standard that Russia should strive to achieve.⁵⁶ Conversely, Peter the Great's reforms brought about resistance to Westernization and the rise of the Slavophiles, who maintain that Russia is uniquely distinct from both the West and the East. Duncan stated,

The centuries old question regarding whether Russia should become part of the West, or follow its own unique Eastern path, acquired new interest after the collapse of the Soviet Union in December 1991. For Westerners in Russia, the 'West' symbolized progress, freedom, democracy, civil society, normality, and a nation-state. The opponents saw the West as representing capitalist exploitation, moral decadence, and American dominance. Westerners saw the 'East' as linked with autocracy, despotism, and empire. Their opponents admired precisely these features, which for them signified a strong state, unity, and order.⁵⁷

Thus, due to the overwhelming power of both Tsarist and Soviet Russia, some Russians believe the nation should follow its own unique path back to greatness and eschew the West as a foundation for its ideals. Thus, Russia can act as economically and as politically illiberal as it likes, due to this notion that the nation is somehow unique from the West and should not be judged using the same standards.

⁵⁴ Jeffrey Mankoff, *Russian Foreign Policy: The Return of Great Power Politics* (New York: Rowan and Littlefield, 2009), 73.

⁵⁵ Robert D. Kaplan, *The Revenge of Geography* (New York: Random House, 2012), 159.

⁵⁶ *Ibid.*, 166.

⁵⁷ Peter J. S. Duncan, "Contemporary Russian Identity Between East and West," *The Historical Journal* 48, no. 1 (2005): 277.

The Russian national identity under Mr. Putin can be described as nationalistic and pragmatic. Duncan stated, “The regime [Putin] was reminiscent of Peter the Great, who introduced some Westernizing reforms while strengthening autocracy and serfdom.”⁵⁸ Putin has both consolidated centralized power and pursued free market economic reforms. Putin is largely said to be an autocrat, somehow taking a governing philosophy in between democracy and outright dictatorship. The Russian inclination toward a “central authority” is a learned behavior dating from its Mongol, Turkic, and Byzantine past, as evidenced by Turkic and Tatar vocabulary in Russian governing language even today. According to March, the reign of the Golden Horde instilled a great sense of tolerance for tyranny while afflicting them with a “paranoid fear of invasion.”⁵⁹ Further, Kaplan deduced that the collectivism of the Russians is mostly driven by the harsh climate of Russia. The short growing season of the highlands forced interdependence in between farmers, as well as collective sowing and reaping due to short growing season. Kaplan quoted Longworth, “...a capacity for suffering, a certain communalism, even a willingness to sacrifice the individual for the common good.”⁶⁰ Thus, patrimonialism and statism are merely a part of the Russian identity. The primacy of the group is ingrained in the Russian psyche, in contrast to Western ideals of individual rights. Thus, many argue that this lack of individualism precludes Russian from ever forming a true Western democracy.

The Putin administration’s priority and focus in foreign policy is the enhancement and influence of Russia in the former Soviet space. Putin is viewed by many in the West as an anti-Western autocrat, who is increasingly leading Russia away from Democracy,

⁵⁸ Ibid.

⁵⁹ Robert D. Kaplan, *The Revenge of Geography* (New York: Random House, 2012), 159.

⁶⁰ Ibid.

stoking the fires of Russian nationalism, and wishes to expand back into the Soviet sphere of influence. Graham stated on Putin's third term as President,

But Putin's return exacerbates the situation, for he symbolizes the stark differences in values, interests, and outlook that still divide Russia and the US and feed the dark images of Russia that, rightly or wrongly, pervade the American political establishment.⁶¹

While one can easily point to anti-democratic practices in Russia such as the murder of political dissidents, the jailing of journalists, bad election management, and state funding of Putin's political party, Russia, as a middle-income developing country, is performing better in the governing arena than any other country in that class, while its economy and government are performing better.⁶² The West tends to view Russia as a collapsed and evil autocratic state rather than a middle-income country struggling to overcome its communist past and deep rooted communist legacy while finding its place in an international system that took great advantage of its collapse.

The Russian Sphere of Influence

In response to aggressive Western encirclement via NATO and the EU, Russia seeks to build a regional sphere of influence that will enable to control the political, economic, and military affairs within that sphere. In an effort to effectively balance the West's cooperative institutions (NATO, EU), Russia has so far worked to establish the CIS as its political cooperation entity, the EEU as its economic cooperation entity, and the CSTO as its military cooperation entity.

Russia founded the CIS in 1991 with the original member states of Russia, Belarus, and Ukraine. Armenia, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova,

⁶¹ Thomas Graham, "Putin the Sequel," *American Interest Magazine*, March/April 2012, 35.

⁶² Ozgur Ozkan, "NATO-Russian Relations in the Twenty-First Century: Obstacles and Opportunities for Strategic Partnership," (Naval War College, Monterrey, December 2012), 66.

Turkmenistan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan and Georgia followed, but Georgia and Ukraine left the CIS in 2008 and 2013, respectively.⁶³ In Russia's first Foreign Policy Concept under President Putin, the CIS was held as "the major thrust of Russia's foreign policy."⁶⁴ Russia believes that it is entitled to "privileged interests" in the CIS, as it comprises the Russian sphere of influence. The CIS is headquartered in Minsk, and coordinates trade, financial, environmental, legal, and national security affairs.⁶⁵ While the CIS is not a political union, and its military and economic functions have been transferred to other entities, the importance of the CIS cannot be understated. Russia views the CIS as the future of a formal Eurasian Union.

Russia formally established the EEU in 2015 with the original member states of Russia, Belarus, and Kazakhstan. Kyrgyzstan and Armenia followed in 2016.⁶⁶ The EEU was preceded by the Eurasian Economic Community and a customs union. The union is modeled on the economic principles of the EU, and is to include a free trade regime, unified customs and nontariff regulations, common access, a unified transportation system, a common energy market, and a single currency.⁶⁷ As with the CIS, the EEU is not a large player in the international field. In 2014 EEU member states contributed to less than 5% of regional GDP, compared to the EU's 17%.⁶⁸ However, the EEU has extremely strong ties to the EU. Russia's trade, both imports and exports, is dominated by

⁶³ David Lane, "Post-Socialist Regions in the World System," *European Politics and Society* 17, no. 1 (2016): 51-52.

⁶⁴ Mark Kramer, "Russian Policy Toward the Commonwealth of Independent States," *Problems of Post-Communism* 55, no. 6 (2008): 4.

⁶⁵ Ibid.

⁶⁶ David Lane, "Post-Socialist Regions in the World System," *European Politics and Society* 17, no. 1 (2016): 54.

⁶⁷ Janusz Bugajski and Margarita Assenova, *Eurasian Disunion* (The Jamestown Foundation: Washington D.C., 2016), 11.

⁶⁸ David Lane, "Post-Socialist Regions in the World System," *European Politics and Society* 17, no. 1 (2016): 55.

the EU. In 2014, Putin proposed the formation of a Free Trade Agreement between the EU and the EEU. However, the relationship between the two entities is not formalized, as contradictory political and economic values between the two economic blocs continues to be a sticking point. Many EU officials view the EEU as a Russian move to establish a state-led economy in its sphere of influence, as Russia has already exerted economic black mail over former Soviet Republics in the way of economic enmeshment, energy dependence, energy alliances, and trade disruptions.^{69 70} Russia's use of economic blackmail as a part of its larger strategy of "hybrid war" in the Baltic States, Central Europe, and Eastern Europe, has hindered any free trade agreement or association between the EU and the EEU thus far.

Lastly, the military cooperation arm of the Russian sphere of influence is filled by the CSTO, founded in 2002. The CSTO is also not a functional organization. Member states are able to buy Russian weapons at discounted prices and contribute to joint peacekeeping forces. Russia currently has 25 military bases in 8 CSTO countries (also South Ossetia and Abkhazia).⁷¹ Currently, Russia uses the CSTO primarily to gain favorable financial concessions for its military bases and to expand its intelligence networks.

Russia's cultivation of a sphere of influence effectively pits the Western institutions of NATO and the EU against battleground nation-states that are either mildly aligned or unaligned with Europe or Asia. While the CIS, EEU, and CSTO can hardly be described as highly functional institutions and are currently of no threat to NATO or the

⁶⁹ Ibid., 58.

⁷⁰ Janusz Bugajski and Margarita Assenova, *Eurasian Disunion* (The Jamestown Foundation: Washington D.C., 2016), 35-36.

⁷¹ Mark Kramer, "Russian Policy Toward the Commonwealth of Independent States," *Problems of Post-Communism* 55, no. 6 (2008): 14.

EU, the EU was not built in a day. Over time, these organizations have the potential to evolve into a formal, highly functioning Eurasian Union. Further, the continued flirtation between Western institutions and both Ukraine and Georgia, is dangerous. Should the West continue to push Russia on key nation-states historically within its sphere of influence, Russia will likely continue to respond via the Spiral Model with both subversive political action and more aggressive military actions in former Soviet Republics.

The Spiral Model in Action: Crimea

The three primary factors which contributed to Russia's use of the Spiral Model in response to Western policy created via the Deterrence Model were NATO expansionism, EU expansionism, and a continued United States' military presence in Europe. Further, due to Russia's unique history with geography and geopolitics and the Centrist political philosophy of Mr. Putin, Russia perceived these policy choices to be offensive, and not defensive in nature. Thus, the West's use of the Deterrence Model actually resulted in Russian policy choices created via the Spiral Model, and thus the Security Dilemma continued. The new and aggressive Russian policy choices via the Spiral Model can be described as culminating in the annexation of Crimea in 2014 and the continued Russian occupation of the Donbass region of eastern Ukraine.

The tangled and connected history of Russia and Ukraine cannot be overlooked or underestimated. Kievan Rus, a 9th century state, is widely lauded by Russians, Ukrainians, and Belarussians as the cradle of the *Rus* civilization.⁷² Annexed by Russia from the Ottoman Empire in 1783, Russia enjoyed Crimea as a part of its territory up until the fall of the Soviet Empire. Crimea was only linked to Ukraine administratively in

⁷² Brian Jenkins, *Crisis in Crimea* (Delaware: Create Space Publishing, 2014), 5.

1954, with no efforts of state building occurring until 1991.⁷³ Second, in terms of the greater Russian identity, President Putin clung to the fact that Crimea is essential to the Russian tradition. After the annexation he stated, "...everything in Crimea speaks to our shared history and pride...in people's hearts and minds. Crimea has always been an inseparable part of Russia."⁷⁴ The presence of a significant fleet of Russian Naval ships in Sevastopol has existed for centuries, making the city a center of Russian power. In terms of ethnic ties, 59% of the Crimean population are ethnic Russians, while Crimea has a significant population of ethnic Crimean Tatars, which is roughly half the population of identifying Ukrainians.⁷⁵ Thus, Russia has clung to long-standing historical narratives of Crimea's inherent "Russianness," as justification for its recent annexation.

The political crux of the Ukrainian crisis of 2014 can be identified as the Euromaidan protests, which resulted in the overthrow of Ukrainian President Yanukovich. In the months before Ukraine's accession talks with the EU began, Mr. Putin exerted enormous pressure on President Yanukovich to halt accession talks and to instead align more formally with Russia, both politically and economically.⁷⁶ These actions clearly signaled to the West that Russia was unwilling to allow Ukraine to exit its sphere of influence. Mr. Putin threatened several debilitating economic sanctions against Ukraine should the agreement be signed. Mr. Putin stated, "Ukraine can make its choice; we respect it, but it will have negative consequences."⁷⁷ President Yanukovich rejected the association agreement with the EU in November of 2013, which set off a wave of

⁷³ Austin Charron, "Whose is Crimea? Contested Sovereignty and Regional Identity, *Region: Regional Studies of Russia, Eastern Europe, and Central Asia* 5, no. 2 (2016): 226.

⁷⁴ Ibid., 230-231.

⁷⁵ Ted Hopf, "Crimea is Ours: A Discursive History." *International Relations* 30, no. 2 (2016): 233.

⁷⁶ Austin Charron, "Whose is Crimea? Contested Sovereignty and Regional Identity, *Region: Regional Studies of Russia, Eastern Europe, and Central Asia* 5, no. 2 (2016): 227-228.

⁷⁷ Ted Hopf, "Crimea is Ours: A Discursive History." *International Relations* 30, no. 2 (2016): 246.

protests in Kiev, to be known as the Euromaidan protests. Yanukovych fled to Russia after the protestors numbered over 500,000, with deaths inflicted by Ukrainian forces. The West largely supported the protests and viewed Russia as affecting the association agreement in an unsavory way.

Putin stated that the Euromaiden movement was hostile to the Russian minority in Ukraine and that the protests were ethno-nationalist in flavor. As the ethnic Russian population largely receives its news from Russian sources, the protests initiated a state of panic in both Eastern Ukraine and Crimea, the areas with the largest Russian populations. Capitalizing on the fear of its countrymen, Russian organized the annexation just four days after the protests ended. The now infamous “little green men,” appeared in both Crimea and Eastern Ukraine.⁷⁸ These men wore unmarked uniforms and were proclaimed as simply locally organized self-defense units to protect ethnic Russians from protestors, however; it was confirmed that they were likely Russian soldiers. The Russian flag was raised over the Crimean Supreme Council building as early as February 27th. On March 16th, an “official” referendum proclaimed Crimea wished to become a part of Russia. Russia reported the turnout of 80.42%, with 96.8% voting in favor of Russian unification.⁷⁹ Russia formally recognized the “Potemkin Referendum” and on March 17th Russia accepted Crimea as a part of the Russian Federation.

The aforementioned narrative of territorial ties, ethnic ties, Putin’s version of Centrism, and the Euromaidan protests enabled the moral and legal pretext for the Russian annexation of Crimea in 2014. In direct response to Ukraine’s EU association talks, and presumably its already existing pre-MAP relationship with NATO, Russia took

⁷⁸ Austin Charron, “Whose is Crimea? Contested Sovereignty and Regional Identity,” *Region: Regional Studies of Russia, Eastern Europe, and Central Asia* 5, no. 2 (2016): 227-228.

⁷⁹Ibid., 229.

action. In accordance with the Spiral Theory, Russia merely reacted to the perceived aggressive actions of the West. Once again, the West's incorrect use of the Deterrence Model to push forward with expansionist policies in both the EU and NATO triggered a specific reaction from Russia. An important lesson to take away from the annexation of Crimea is that Russia has the very same ethnic and historical links to many other nation-states and to smaller territories within existing nation-states as well. Should the West continue to push for NATO and EU expansion into former Soviet Republics, Russia will likely use "little green men" to create unrest in order to support a regime change, to strong arm states against realigning with the West, or to conduct similar annexations in the future.

While Russia already annexed Crimea, Abkhazia, and Ossetia, a variety of other states are feeling pressure from Russia in terms of alignment, such as the Baltic States, the Central Asian republics, and the caucuses. Further, Russia has its eyes on the Transnistria and Gagauz regions of Moldova, that it may annex, if pushed, in the future. All of these territories were a part of the former Soviet empire, retain some sort of semi-autonomous status, and contain a large population of ethnic Russians separated from the motherland during the break-up of the empire.

Conclusion

Structural International Relations theory's Security Dilemma constitutes a model of war and peace that depends on interactions. The Spiral Model and the Deterrence Model identify dynamics that may lead to the outbreak of war or the keeping of peace. The Deterrence Model was deployed in order to create the post-Cold War policies of the West toward Russia. However, instead of "keeping the peace," these policies have

created a new Security Dilemma with Russia due to extreme western encirclement through military, political, and economic alliances and the continued military posturing of the US in Europe.

The West failed to recognize that the unique Russian identity, as formulated during centuries of invasion and tyranny due to poor geographic conditions and the geopolitical climate, would affect Russian perceptions of the post-Cold War policy formulations of the West. Further, President Putin's Centrist political philosophy exempts Russia from Western judgements on its autocratic governmental system due to its existence as a "historical other" that must find its own unique way in the world. This Centrist philosophy also calls for Russia to be the leading Eurasian power, and thus President Putin will likely continue to pursue both the expansion of Russian territory via annexations and the enlargement of the CIS, EEU, and CSTO in order to formulate a powerful Eurasian Community to rival the economic and political power of the EU and the military might of NATO.

In order to escape the Security Dilemma, the West must resist the urge to use "strong" policy moves created via the Deterrence Model in order to prevent Russia from continuing its aggressive actions. The West must use the Spiral Model to formulate policy via Russia as a result of Russia's foreign policy motivations of fear and insecurity. Due to perceived intentions of Western policy, in recent years, Russia annexed part of a sovereign nation, supported the secession of two territories of another sovereign nation, and regularly exercised differing forms of hybrid warfare such as economic blackmail, diplomatic pressures, cyberspace warfare, disinformation campaigns, and media

manipulation, to name a few, in many other former Soviet Republics. Thus, policy stemming from the West's use of the Deterrence Model is not working.

In order to escape the policy choices made by Russia due to insecurity and fear, the West must change its policy choices. First, and most directly, the US, working as the unofficial head of NATO and of the "West," must end the shows of force via its Deterrence Model policies. The ERI is a highly inflammatory deterrence policy choice that has already been perceived by Russia as an offensive policy. Russia responded in turn by ramping up its activities in the Baltic air space by utilizing tactics such as not using IFF transponders and "buzzing" NATO aircraft and surface vessels. These are extremely unsafe tactics making the Baltic Air Space and both the Mediterranean and Black Seas unsafe. A slight miscalculation by a Russian aircraft could result in a serious mishap with a NATO aircraft or surface vessel which would possibly lead to the outbreak of war. Further, Russia is increasing its military budget and further ramping up its military exercises. NATO and Russia must commence meaningful talks via the NATO-Russian Council in order to deescalate the situation, which has been in a spiral since the 2014 suspension of all practical cooperation between NATO and Russia.

Second, NATO and the EU must rethink long-term policy choices in reference to Russia. The EU is much more closely tied to Russia, in both politics and economics, than the United States. The EU's CFSP should be purposefully evolved in order to give the policy some real teeth, with the creation of a real pool of shared assets, shared personnel, and prepositioned supplies and equipment of a much higher magnitude than the current EU Battlegroup structure entails. "Brexit" poses a dynamic change with regards to the future of the CFSP in the EU, as England historically refused any such dialogue common

resources. In contrast, Germany and France have typically been very open to discussing such a concept, and thus now is the time to begin the move to craft such policy. Further, Georgia and Ukraine must not be given NATO MAPs, while their Association Agreements with the EU should be terminated. Thus, the West would remove both NATO and EU expansion as policy options in the future which would provide a foundation for a new regime of policy created via the Spiral Model.

Lastly, Russia and the EU could eventually move toward a real and lasting relationship that is fundamentally less resentful than any relationship that NATO, and thus the US, could ever have with Russia. The relationship between Russia and NATO, and thus the US, will never be able to be truly meaningful, due to many decades of mistrust and poor policy choices. In order to escape the Spiral Model, the EU must first release itself from the current integration dilemma it finds itself in with Russia due to the offer of future EU membership for both Georgia and Ukraine. Second, it must make meaningful strides to enable itself to be a military, political, and economic entity worthy of effectively addressing Russia on the international stage.

Chapter Two

NATO: The State of the Trans-Atlantic Alliance in Light of the New Russian Threat

Since the end of the Cold War, NATO has often been described as an alliance “in crisis.” While the alliance is in no way under threat of falling into disarray, it is unclear whether or not NATO has a purpose without the external Russian threat within the security environment of the Cold War. Many scholars argue that NATO can simply no longer define its identity or clarify its “raison d’etre.”⁸⁰ Since the end of the Cold War, NATO has undertaken major operations in Afghanistan and Libya, among others. It is obvious that none of these operations had a direct impact on the territorial integrity of any alliance member, or directly involved the external Russian threat. Thus, the question remains. Is a political alliance and military collective created to wage the Cold War relevant in the altered setting of a post-Cold War Europe?

The future generation of policy-making Americans is not a generation who participated in the world wars, or even in the Cold War. Future policy makers and policy influencers are a generation who witnessed the round-up of the Taliban in Afghanistan in 2001 and the “shock and awe” of overwhelming military strikes on Baghdad in 2003. President Obama’s “pivot to Asia” cemented the current generation’s view that future economic power and military focus will be found within the Middle East and Asia. To this end, current American hunger and popular opinion for European-focused policy has decreased- the Eurocentric worldview is gone and will be for the foreseeable future.⁸¹ NATO operations and budgets largely focus on European conditions, and not conditions that directly affect the United States. With American focus on Asia, and major concerns

⁸⁰ Naval War College Cooperative, *NATO-Russia Relations in the Twenty-First Century: Obstacles and Opportunities for Strategic Partnership* (Newport: Naval War College, 2011), 1.

⁸¹ Magnus Peterson, *The US NATO Debate* (New York: Bloomsbury, 2015), 6.

such as the European debt crisis (ongoing since 2009) and “Brexit”, the EU (EU) has hardly presented itself as a pillar of strength to an already European-wary American population.⁸² This popular opinion pairs with the continued debate on “burden sharing” within NATO, that is to say, the proportionate contribution of money to NATO’s budget from member states. By and large, the US has grown tired of acting as the main financial contributor to an organization that benefits mostly European-specific interests.

After the conclusion of the Cold War, NATO rushed to expand the territory of the alliance, moving to include most of Central and Eastern Europe in order to create more stable spaces suitable for democracy, the rule of law, and human rights. While Russia struggled to rebuild itself politically, militarily, and economically, the West encroached on Russia’s area of influence and added Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Poland, Hungary, Germany, Romania, Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia to the alliance. Further, Georgia, Armenia, Belarus, Moldova, Ukraine, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Azerbaijan were added as NATO Partner States.⁸³ This rapid expansionism led to a resurgent Russian nationalism, ultimately resulting in the Russian annexation of Crimea in 2014.

With the current popular view of the EU as a supranational institution in disarray, along with NATO incitement of a newly imperial Russia and burden sharing debates, the original question of NATO’s usefulness as a political alliance and military institution remains. This thesis examines whether or not the strategic alliance has proven itself effective in the post-Cold War security environment. First, an analysis of benchmark NATO “strategic concepts” proves that the alliance has evolved effectively with the

⁸² Robert Hunter, “NATO in Context,” *Prism* 6, no. 2 (2015): 16-17.

⁸³ Robert Art, “Creating a Disaster: NATO’s Open Door Policy,” *Political Science Quarterly* 131, no. 2 (2016): 2.

changing security environment. However, while NATO has indeed managed to add meaningfully to its mission focus, the factors of NATO expansionism and burden sharing are targeted as reasons for which the alliance has ultimately faltered in the face of its primary external threat- Russia. Lastly, this thesis explores NATO within a new trans-Atlantic burden sharing model; Europe should take the reins of its own defense with a bolstered Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), with the US participating solely in an Article V-focused role.

This research is pertinent due to the resurgent threat of Russia in the post-Cold War security environment. The Russian threat is real, due, in large part, to the West's mismanagement of its Russian foreign policy regime. As Europe is on Russia's western periphery, it is of the utmost importance that Europe be able to finally provide for its own defense capabilities, without relying on the United States. NATO should not be assumed as the military arm of the EU, as has been institutionalized by the EU in the Lisbon Treaty.⁸⁴ Further, the United States, as a result of the current burden sharing dynamic, has no current need to approach Russian militarily, especially for such politically and strategically unimportant territories as Ukraine and Georgia. To the EU, however, Georgia and Ukraine are hugely important territories. Thus, NATO should be redesigned as a political alliance with focus on security cooperation only in an Article V function. It is in the best interests of the US, both politically and economically, for Europe to stand on its own two feet in the security environment and be able to defend its territorial integrity, which it was unable to do in the cases of Georgia and Ukraine. Thus, the EU's

⁸⁴ Andrew Michta, "Dealing with Russia: A New 2020 Vision?" in *The Future of NATO: Regional Defense and Global Security*, eds Andrew Michta and Paal Hilde (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2014), 58-59.

CFSP must be expanded to include a common military infrastructure so that the EU may contribute to its own security.

While expansionism and burden sharing remain two critiques of NATO that explain the origin of the current uneasy security environment in Europe, scholars remain undecided on the correct path of NATO for the future. In, “Declaring Victory and Getting Out of Europe: Why the North Atlantic Treaty Organization Should Disband,” it is argued that NATO is an ineffective organization within the confines of the current security environment. That is, NATO cannot solve the problems of global Islamic insurgency or economic crises unless one of its members is attacked directly. This document also argues that Europe and the US were driven apart on the issues of Iraq and Afghanistan, exacerbating existing political tensions and strategic disagreements.⁸⁵ Further, it is argued that a transfer of power should occur between NATO and the EU, in order for Europe to take the reins of their own security and to place European security in the hands of European nations.

In contrast, a large number of scholars argue that NATO is still very useful as a political and military alliance. In, “To Carry Out NATO’s Mission in This More Dangerous World,” Jens Stoltenberg argued that NATO can counter revitalized Russian imperialism in Europe’s periphery, the migrant crisis stemming from unrest in the Middle East, global Islamic insurgency, cyber-attacks, and nuclear and ballistic-missile proliferation. That is to say, NATO is still relevant, and can succeed, in the current

⁸⁵ Houston Journal of International Law, “Declaring Victory and Getting Out of Europe: Why the North Atlantic Treaty Organization Should Disband,” *Houston Journal of International Law* 25, no. 2 (2003): 354.

international security environment.⁸⁶ In, “The Future of NATO,” Younghoon Moon argued that Europe’s security remains far from assured in the face of the Russian threat. Since Europe cannot actively engage in its own defense, NATO is entirely relevant. Further, he argues that NATO’s global reach will have positive implications in areas such as Africa, where the African Union continuously requires assistance to enforce security.⁸⁷

In “The Future of NATO,” Brian Weinrod argued that NATO’s future role will largely be a global one. He explained NATO as a global security forum, a global security network, and a global democratic security community. NATO remains the only military organization with significant regional and global military reach that can respond to crises and humanitarian disasters.⁸⁸ Zinaida Bechna and Bradley Thayer also agree that NATO’s new role should be a global one. However, they argue that NATO’s main threat is now China, and not Russia. While the “pivot” to Asia makes the US less willing to involve itself in European affairs, NATO can still be an effective mechanism with which to counterbalance the rise of China. Strategists expect China to seek alliances piecemeal in the West, in an effect to divide the alliance, and as such, a strong NATO would deter this from occurring.⁸⁹ Scholars such as Mats Berdal and David Ucko in “NATO at 60,” and Mark Webber, Ellen Hallams, and Martin A. Smith in “Repairing NATO’s Motors,” agree that NATO’s future involves countering the Russian threat, the Chinese threat, and asymmetric threats.^{90 91} NATO’s usefulness as both a political and military alliance

⁸⁶ Jens Stoltenberg, “To Carry Out NATO’s Mission in this More Dangerous World,” *Vital Speeches of the Day*, July (2016).

⁸⁷ Younghoon Moon, “The Future of NATO,” *Harvard International Review*, Winter (2013): 19-20.

⁸⁸ W. Bruce Weinrod, “The Future of NATO,” *Mediterranean Quarterly* 23, no. 2 (2012): 7-8.

⁸⁹ Zinaida Bechna and Bradley A. Thayer, “NATO’s New Role,” *Naval War College Review* (2013): 71-71.

⁹⁰ Mark Webber, Ellen Hallams, and Martin A. Smith, “Repairing NATO’s Motors,” *International Affairs* 90, no. 4 (2014): 792.

⁹¹ Mats Berdal and David Ucko, “NATO at 60,” *Survival* 51, no. 2 (2009): 71-72.

leverages important institutions and capabilities that no other country or organization can leverage in the face of any threat, symmetric or asymmetric.

While most scholars agree that NATO is still useful as a political and military alliance, even though they disagree to what degree, and to what effect, the question remains- what relationship should NATO have with Russia moving forward? In, “NATO-Russian Relations in the Twenty-First Century,” the Naval War College collective argued the importance of the NATO-Russia Council (NRC) as a balanced and viable solution and venue for increasing partnership and compromise between the alliance and Russia.⁹² Martin Smith, *In Russia and NATO since 1991*, argued that a rapprochement was largely underway with Russia after the September 11th terrorist attacks, while divergent interests during the Iraq war did not cause large-scale tension between the two nations. However, he argues it cannot be predicted if a “future normative partnership” can truly be forged between the alliance and Russia. That is to say, NATO is a cooperative community based on established norms and values such as individual freedom, democracy, and the rule of law. Can Russia truly participate as even a “partner” in such a community? Smith argues, likely not. He argues that the partnership will be pragmatic. That is, a relationship based on expedient and tactical calculations that can only operate when interests coincide.⁹³ Thus, the relationship will most likely never involve large, important issues. In, “From Wales to Warsaw: NATO’s Future Beyond the Ukraine Crisis.” Karl-Heinze Kamp argued that recent Russian actions in both Georgia and Ukraine prove that Russian can

⁹² Naval War College Cooperative, *NATO-Russian Relations in the Twenty-First Century: Obstacles and Opportunities for Strategic Partnership* (Newport: Naval War College, 2011), 84.

⁹³ Martin A. Smith, *Russia and NATO Since 1991: From Cold War Through Cold Peace to Partnership?* (London: Routledge, 2006): 50.

only be a NATO neighbor without any effective partnership agreement, or it can be an adversary.⁹⁴

NATO's unchecked expansion into Central and Eastern Europe effectively encircled Russia and was directly responsible for resurgent Russian imperialism, as evidenced by Russian actions in both Georgia and Ukraine. Further, ineffective burden sharing entrenched the US as the main actor within NATO, resulting in NATO refusing military action against Russia in response to its actions in Georgia and Ukraine. While Europe remains too little involved in supplying, funding, and executing its own security apparatus, the US will continue to ignore destabilizing territorial issues on the periphery of the EU.

NATO Since the End of the Cold War: Mission Evolution

The presence of the Soviet Army in Eastern Europe after World War II led the West to create a collective defense entity in order to increase European territorial security. In turn, the Soviet Union created the Warsaw Pact in order to balance out the new, Western security collective. And thus, the modern world's longest game of geopolitical chess began between NATO and the Soviet Union. However, after the Berlin Wall fell as the Soviet Union met its ultimate demise, political scientists and government officials predicted the short and unceremonious death of NATO. The 1990's proved to be a difficult time for NATO, as the alliance struggled with prioritizing out-of-area engagements with strict territorial defense. However, an analysis of NATO's "Strategic Concepts" from 1991, 1999, and 2010 show that NATO effectively adapted effectively

⁹⁴ Karl-Heinz Kamp, "From Wales to Warsaw: NATO's Future Beyond the Ukraine Crisis," *American Foreign Interests* 36 (2014): 362.

and garnered the skills required to operate within the ever-changing regional and international security environment.

NATO's Strategic Concept of 1991 affirmed territorial defense as the core task of NATO.⁹⁵ As such, NATO was not involved in the Gulf War. From 1992-1995, NATO became involved in the Bosnian War, and thus entered the out-of-area security business. In terms of out-of-area activities, NATO also took the leap from peace-keeping to peace-enforcement during the Bosnian War, as the alliance deployed ground troops, enforced a no-fly zone, and conducted air strikes.⁹⁶ The United Nations Security Council (UNSC) issued a mandate for these activities, while the NATO Implementation Force (IFOR) replaced the UN Protection Force in 1995, operating independently of the UN in the security force arena for the first time.

NATO's comfortability outside of its Article 6 boundaries continued in 1999 during the Kosovo Conflict, with NATO conducting operations wholly without a UNSC mandate. UNSC Resolution (UNSCR) 1160 mandated the "consideration of additional measures" should the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) authorities not enter into serious political dialogue with Kosovar Albanians concerning Kosovo's future.⁹⁷ While Russia maintained itself as a steadfast supporter of FRY during the conflict, it voted in favor of 1160. Another UNSCR passed in 1998, which made specific demands on Serbian leaders, and, once again, threatened "to consider further action and additional measures to maintain or restore peace and stability in the region."⁹⁸ Typically, another

⁹⁵ Andrew Michta, "The Out-of-Area Question in Historical Perspective," in *The Future of NATO: Regional Defense and Global Security*, eds Andrew Michta and Paal Hilde (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2014), 25.

⁹⁶ *Ibid.*, 25.

⁹⁷ Martin A. Smith, *Russia and NATO Since 1991* (London: Routledge, 2006), 78-79.

⁹⁸ *Ibid.*

UNSCR would be needed in order for a use of force to be mandated. Thus, Russia voted in favor of 1199, as it felt it could veto any further measure to use force against Serbia.

After a failed conference on peace negotiations at Rambouillet in February of 1999, NATO launched Operation Allied Force with air strikes against Serbian forces, without obtaining a new UNSCR. Thus, NATO effectively ignored Russia's only claim to institutionalized international influence- the UNSC. Ignoring Russia's great power status, paired with conducting military operations in Russia's area of influence, placed a serious chip in NATO-Russian relations. Further, public opinion in Russia turned against NATO in 1999, with a poll finding that 90 percent of Russians felt that NATO had no right to bomb Yugoslavia, while 70 percent of Russians felt that NATO was a direct threat to Russia.⁹⁹ Newly elected Russian Prime Minister Sergei Stephashin said on Operation Allied Force in 1999, "Let's be frank,...NATO's air strike against Yugoslavia is perhaps not so much against Yugoslavia- as it is a strike against Russia."¹⁰⁰ In that same year, NATO's newest Strategic Concept included conflict prevention and crisis management as fundamental security tasks for the alliance- a huge stride from its 1991 Strategic Concept, just 8 years earlier. Basing its newest strategic concept on the West's claim that military force was required in such cases of dramatic humanitarian need, the 1999 Strategic Concept focused on, "common values of Democracy, human rights, and the rule of law."¹⁰¹

After the terrorist attacks of September 11th, 2001, NATO again redefined itself. This time, its expanded mission focus molded NATO as an expeditionary alliance capable of delivering security, wherever needed. Thus, NATO moved from the territorial defense of

⁹⁹ J. L. Black, *Russia Faces NATO Expansion* (Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, 2000), 111.

¹⁰⁰ Ibid., 115.

¹⁰¹ Brian Collins, *NATO: A Guide to the Issues* (Santa Barbara: Praeger, 2011), 96.

Europe during the Cold War, to the crisis management in Europe's periphery during the 1990's, to out-of-area threats to *international* security, vice only regional security, in the new millennium. With the invocation of Article V by the US for the first time in alliance history, The International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), the NATO led security mission in Afghanistan, began.¹⁰² The UNSC established ISAF with resolution 1386, with the mission of ISAF being the training of Afghani security forces and reconstruction. However, ISAF forces were largely engaged in a war with the Taliban for the better part of a decade. It must be mentioned, however, that the US largely led the efforts in Afghanistan through its Operation Enduring Freedom. NATO's efforts through ISAF were limited, even though "ISAF" was largely stamped on all operations. NATO had no contingency plans for such expeditionary operations, and further, Europe had relatively little to offer in the way of strategic capabilities.¹⁰³ The Commander of ISAF, a position solely filled by an American commander, dual-hatted as both the Commander of Operation Enduring Freedom and the Commander of ISAF. NATO did, however, lead Operation Active Endeavor in the Mediterranean during this time period, enforcing freedom of the seas during ISAF. With terrorist attacks in Madrid and London occurring after ISAF began, the operation picked up steam as a "NATO" operation. By 2010, 100,000 troops were in theatre from 46 different countries.¹⁰⁴ While the US largely ran operations in Afghanistan under Operation Enduring Freedom, the ISAF umbrella was credited for the operation, and NATO demonstrated expeditionary capabilities among many member states and partner states.

¹⁰² Belkin, Paul, "NATO: Response to the Crisis in Ukraine and Security Concerns in Central and Eastern Europe," (Congressional Research Service, Washington D.C., April 16th, 2014), 106.

¹⁰³ Brian Collins, *NATO: A Guide to the Issues* (Santa Barbara: Praeger, 2011), 105.

¹⁰⁴ *Ibid.*, 106.

The Libyan war in 2011 may be called a historical moment for NATO, in that NATO did not ride on the coattails of the US during operations, as in Afghanistan. Phillippe Gros stated, “The operation in Libya represented a real breakthrough from a transatlantic perspective, as it can be considered the first Western large-scale coercive military engagement not led by the United States.”¹⁰⁵ In November of 2010, before the Libyan War, NATO’s new Strategic Concept entitled, “Active Engagement, Modern Defense,” debuted. Political Scientists have stated that the Strategic Concept of 2010 is perhaps the most important NATO document since the Washington Treaty designating NATO’s founding. This Strategic Concept defined the three core tasks of NATO as collective defense, crisis management, and cooperative security.¹⁰⁶

NATO’s mission focus evolution from an exclusive focus on territorial defense to an overseeing a range of military and crisis management operations across the globe grinded to a halt in 2014 when Russia invaded Ukraine and annexed Crimea. After more than a decade of war in Afghanistan, and with operations in Libya, NATO found itself drawn back into its original mission focus- territorial defense against the Russian threat. NATO Secretary General Rasmussen stated on Russian’s military aggression in Ukraine as, “the most serious crisis in Europe since the fall of the Berlin Wall.”¹⁰⁷ NATO has not responded to Russia in a direct, military fashion. Rather, NATO has shown demonstrations of support for Ukraine including strengthening ties for military cooperation, the deployment of additional Airborne Early Warning assets to the Baltic Air Policing Mission, and the suspension of all “practical” civilian and military

¹⁰⁵ Magnus Petersson, *The US NATO Debate* (New York: Bloomsbury, 2015), 27.

¹⁰⁶ Ibid., 28.

¹⁰⁷ Belkin, Paul, “NATO: Response to the Crisis in Ukraine and Security Concerns in Central and Eastern Europe,” (Congressional Research Service, Washington D.C., April 16th, 2014).

cooperation with Russia in the framework of the NATO-Russian Council (NRC). ¹⁰⁸ The US has long since bulked its military presence in Eastern Europe, with a new, Special Purpose Marine Air Ground Task Force in addition to the Black Sea Rotational Force, enhanced Naval presence in the Black and Baltic Sea, new ballistic missile defense stations in Romania and Poland, and forward-based multiple Navy Ballistic Missile Defense assets in the Mediterranean theater. The US alone has approximately 70,000 forces permanently stationed in Europe today. ¹⁰⁹

The NATO's Wales Summit of 2014 agreed on a Readiness Action Plan (RAP) to enhance the military protection of NATO's easternmost members. The RAP consists of military exercises, prepositioning, and an eastern command and control presence- it is essentially a posturing of NATO resources in the east but comes short of establishing a permanent eastern NATO presence. ¹¹⁰ The 2014 Wales Summit also resulted in a Comprehensive Assistance Package for Ukraine. ¹¹¹ For obvious reasons, Article V could not be invoked in response to the annexation of Crimea, as Ukraine is not a member of NATO.

In sum, the 1991, 1999, and 2010 Strategic Concepts prove that NATO evolved its mission focus as the security environment changed. In 1991, NATO reaffirmed the territorial defense of Europe as its primary mission. By 1999, NATO conducted successful, regional operations in both peace keeping and peace enforcement. By 2010, NATO adopted a global security framework capable of deploying NATO assets and personnel worldwide, in support of expeditionary operations. Further, NATO

¹⁰⁸ Ibid.

¹⁰⁹ Ibid.

¹¹⁰ Michael Ruhle, "NATO and the Ukraine Crisis," *American Foreign Policy Interests* 37 (2015): 82-83.

¹¹¹ North Atlantic Treaty Organization, "Joint Statement of the NATO-Ukraine Commission at the Level of Heads of State and Government," (Warsaw, July 9th, 2016).

spearheaded operations in Libya and worked to wind down a successful ISAF mission in Afghanistan. The evolution of NATO's mission focus and capability sets between 1991 and 2010 cannot be overstated. The alliance has proven itself willing and capable of responding to an ever-changing security environment and contributing meaningfully to maintaining order within an increasingly unstable international community.

NATO Since the End of the Cold War: Institutional Cooperation

NATO created the Partnership for Peace (PfP) Program in 1994 so that former Warsaw Pact States, former Soviet Republics, and neutral European States could create a bilateral relationship with NATO.¹¹² The PfP covers military contact and cooperation activities as well as discourse on democratic control of armed forces and joint military training. The initial response from Russia and the Yeltsin government was positive, however, Yeltsin believed that the PfP program was an alternative for former Soviet States to becoming full-fledged NATO member states. In spite of this, Russia became a NATO PfP member state in 1994. The implications of NATO expansionism into former Soviet Republics will be discussed in detail later in this paper.

After joining PfP, Russia moved for an institutionalized relationship with NATO, which would set Russia apart from other PfP member states as a "great power." The NATO-Russian Founding Act of 1997 provided the formal basis for bilateral cooperation between NATO and Russia. NATO signed multiple pledges such as restricting the additional permanent stationing of forces in new member states and the restriction of nuclear weapons storage in new member states.¹¹³ Further, the NATO-Russian Founding Act created the Permanent Joint Council (PJC) as the "mechanism for consultation and

¹¹² Brian Collins, *NATO: A Guide to the Issues* (Santa Barbara: Praeger, 2011), 94.

¹¹³ *Ibid.*, 71.

cooperation” between NATO and Russia. This “council of 17,” was to meet regularly, and Russia was to appoint a new ambassador to head their new mission to NATO. This Ambassador was to remain seated at the Russian Belgium Embassy however, and not at NATO Headquarters.¹¹⁴ Further, Russia’s presence within the PJC did not give it veto authority over any NATO action, it was merely a mechanism by which Russia’s voice could be heard within the alliance- a mechanism that no other Pfp state possessed.

The current principle institutional mechanism for NATO-Russia cooperation is the NRC. The NRC was established in 2002, five years after the NATO-Russian Founding Act provided the formal basis for bilateral cooperation between NATO and Russia. During his first years in office, President Putin routinely commented that Russia should be a member state of NATO- and that if Russia was not a member state, then NATO had no real purpose.¹¹⁵ The NRC allowed Russia to maintain a permanent presence at NATO headquarters, unlike the PRC, while a “preparatory committee” was created to conduct the necessary agenda setting and preparation stages of the consultative process. To the Russians, this new presence during agenda setting would keep alliance members from forming alliance positions before hearings and made the NRC more legitimate than the PJC.

President Putin utilized the NRC to his advantage and capitalized on the United States’ seeming need for the broadest possible “coalition of the willing” for operations in Afghanistan.¹¹⁶ Further, the NRC conducted business as usual during the Iraq crisis of 2002, when Russian backed UNSCR 1441, giving Iraq a “final opportunity” to comply with UN demands. While the US did not obtain a UNSCR authorizing the use of force in

¹¹⁴ Ibid., 72.

¹¹⁵ Ibid., 109.

¹¹⁶ Ibid., 93.

Iraq, Russia operated on a stance of “passive neutrality” during Operation Iraqi Freedom. Most scholars attributed the non-breakdown in relations with Russia over Iraq to the relationship fostered in the NRC.¹¹⁷

Russia participated with NATO as a PfP member in the Bosnian Implementation and Security Force (IFOR/SFOR) and in the Kosovo Force (KFOR), as well as with NATO in ISAF.¹¹⁸ However, many scholars argue that headway with Russia has been minimal, even with a formal institution like the NRC with which to foster cooperation and dispute resolution. The relationship between Russian and NATO is ripe with mistrust and contention. A serious bone of contention since the founding of the NRC is the missile defense issue.¹¹⁹ The European Phased Adaptive Approach (EPAA) was to be an anti-ballistic missile defense system with land-based nodes in Romania, Poland, and the Czech Republic with moveable, sea-based nodes in the Mediterranean, in the form of US Navy Aegis Cruisers or Destroyers. However, President Obama scrapped the Czech Republic node, in a seeming attempt to appease President Putin’s objections. US Naval assets continue to operate in the Mediterranean, while the land-based Romanian site is fully functional with the Poland site coming online in 2020.¹²⁰

Both Russia and NATO have worked since the end of the Cold War to determine exactly how the two entities should interact. The NRC is the current mechanism for cooperation; however, the modern world’s longest game of geopolitics has merely entered another chapter. With the Russian annexation of Crimea in 2014, NRC business

¹¹⁷ Martin A. Smith, *Russia and NATO Since 1991* (London: Routledge, 2006), 102.

¹¹⁸ Ibid., 95.

¹¹⁹ Andrew Michta, “Conclusion: Building on ISAF, Looking to the Future,” in *The Future of NATO: Regional Defense and Global Security*, eds Andrew Michta and Paal Hilde (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2014), 185.

¹²⁰ Ibid., 62-63.

came to a close in 2014 but began again in 2016. While Russia and NATO found some operations in which they could cooperate, the two entities have never been able to effectively cooperate in the former Soviet area of operations. The conflicts in Bosnia and Kosovo, the EPAA, and the annexation of Crimea prove that there is no truly functioning cooperative institution from which Russia and NATO can ever use effectively.

How America Got into the NATO Driver's Seat: Burden Sharing

One of the main critiques on the functionality of NATO since the end of the Cold War is the issue of “burden sharing.” Darrell Driver, in “Burden Sharing and the Future of NATO: Wandering Between Two Worlds,” argued that the incentive for the US to remain the *primus inter pares* of the trans-Atlantic Alliance is rapidly fading.¹²¹ The US encouraged its European partners to spend a higher percentage of GDP on military expenditures (largely to no avail) since the alliance’s founding. The consequence of this highly disproportionate burden sharing agreement results in the alliance making security decisions based on the preferences of the largest stake holder- the United States.

Under President Reagan in 1977, the agreement on military spending stipulated each ally to increase military spending by 3 percent a year, which did not occur. In 2013, total NATO European allies, on average, spent about 1.3 percent of GDP on defense, with only Greece and the UK spending 2 percent.¹²² By 1988, the US funded 63 percent of NATO’s defense burden, while only accounting for 47 percent of total alliance GDP. Today, Europe accounts for less than one-third of NATO’s total expenditures on defense,

¹²¹ Darrell Driver, “Burden Sharing and the Future of NATO: Wandering Between Two Worlds,” *Defense and Security Analysis* 32, no. 1 (2016): 4.

¹²² Belkin, Paul, “NATO: Response to the Crisis in Ukraine and Security Concerns in Central and Eastern Europe,” (Congressional Research Service, Washington D.C., April 16th, 2014).

with the US making up the difference.¹²³ Many scholars believe that the US has never been able to effectively admonish NATO member states for failing to aid the defense budget more fully because Europe knows that the United States leverages NATO in order to maintain its hegemonic status. E. Wayne Merry stated, “Europe can neither become a responsible power center nor a competent partner for the US so long as Europeans remain dependent on a non-European power for their security.”¹²⁴ Throughout the 1990’s, European militaries cut spending by 22 percent. This fact was highly visible in the Kosovo Campaign in 1999, with the US contributing to 65-70 percent of the conflict’s costs. On the conflict in Kosovo, George Robertson said, “In Kosovo we have all come face to face with the European future, and it is frightening.”¹²⁵

Essentially, a lack of burden sharing with the NATO defense budget resulted in the US acting as the de facto leader of the alliance. This, in turn, allows for NATO’s defense policies to be driven by the United States, and not Europe- the region most directly affected by the Russian threat. In the non-article V operations in both Bosnia and Kosovo, Europe demonstrated a unique inability to respond militarily in any way.¹²⁶ Effective burden sharing will never occur within NATO, and thus the US will continue to occupy the driver’s seat in pushing NATO defense policy. For this reason, Europe should remain unsurprised when NATO is unwilling to become militarily involved in fending off weak Eastern European states and EU border states from Russian advances, such as in the cases of both Georgia and Ukraine.

¹²³ Andrew Michta, “Regional versus Global Priorities- Can NATO get the balance right?” in *The Future of NATO: Regional Defense and Global Security*, eds Andrew Michta and Paal Hilde (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2014), 1.

¹²⁴ Darrell Driver, “Burden Sharing and the Future of NATO: Wandering Between Two Worlds,” *Defense and Security Analysis* 32, no. 1 (2016): 9.

¹²⁵ Ibid., 15.

¹²⁶ Alan Tonelson, “NATO Burden Sharing: Promises, Promises,” *Journal of Strategic Studies* 23, no. 3 (2000): 46.

How NATO Provoked the Resurgent Russian Threat

Since the end of the Cold War, NATO moved passed the “simple” concept of a trans-Atlantic alliance against a singular, external threat, and shifted toward a modern security agenda with out-of-area adversaries. The alliance shifted from focus on policy related to a singular, external threat, to a focus on all external threats to the alliance. However, in the midst of moving toward a more global approach, NATO undertook a large expansionist project in an effort to create the largest, most powerful trans-Atlantic alliance possible. After the Cold War, NATO developed an “open door” policy in an effort to spread democracy, security, and stability further across Europe. Russia points to this expansionist policy as “encirclement,” meant to use NATO as a Western political and military tool to influence Russian’s neighbors to turn West, and not East.¹²⁷ While this entire list of former Soviet satellites is sizeable, one can argue that Georgia and Ukraine’s presence on that list has caused the most strain between NATO and Russia.

In, “Creating a Disaster: NATO’s Open Door Policy,” Robert Art explained that not only has NATO’s rapid expansion to Central and Eastern Europe effectively provoked aggressive Russian foreign policy, but that it has also weakened the alliance, as barely democratized nations with little to no military capability have been added to the alliance in rapid succession.¹²⁸ The expansion of NATO into Russian’s Western frontier could be perceived no other way than as a form of Western aggression. Further, the break-up of the USSR left sizeable ethnic Russian populations in many states across Central and Eastern Europe. Historically, these populations have faced discrimination and mistreatment from “democratic” governments. Russia has legitimate geo-strategic

¹²⁷ J.L. Black, *Russia Faces NATO Expansion* (Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield, 2000): 11.

¹²⁸ Robert Art, “Creating a Disaster: NATO’s Open Door Policy,” *Political Science Quarterly* 131, no. 2 (2016): 2.

concerns in both Central and Eastern Europe and thus its aggressive foreign policy and military action in the area should not be a surprise.¹²⁹

Christ Hart explained in “Plan for Peace: NATO Expansion and United States-Russian Relations,” that NATO expansion in and of itself implies that Russia is a constant threat to the trans-Atlantic alliance. Even liberal-minded Soviet premiers such as Boris Yeltsin have condemned NATO’s post-Cold War expansion as “hawkish.” Hart further explained that the West should not be surprised when Russia is driven to build its own set of allies or pursue its lofty goal of a “Eurasian Union,” in order to balance its power against the West.¹³⁰ NATO’s expansionism effectively led to an agreement among Russian elites that the Alliance violated “accepted rules” under which the Cold War had ended. Further, in an effort to consolidate power, NATO did not take into consideration the consequences that enlargement into previously Soviet space would have on any future relationship with Russia.¹³¹

The expansion of NATO to include former Soviet Republics effectively encircled Russia with newly formed independent states now realigned with the West. Further, this expansionism effectively isolated a “new” Russia from Europe. This policy may have seemed logical while Russia appeared weak after the collapse of the USSR, but proved to provoke aggressive foreign policy from Russia. Russia currently possesses a small center of influence with Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan within the

¹²⁹ Michael Clarke, “NATO Expansion: A Policy Error of Historic Importance,” *International Affairs* 84, no. 6 (2008): 1286.

¹³⁰ Chris Hart, “Plan for Peace: NATO Expansion and US-Russian Relations,” *Harvard International Law Review* 19, no. 4 (1997): 1.

¹³¹ J.L. Black, *Russia Faces NATO Expansion* (Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield, 2000): 7.

EEU, but seeks a larger center of influence that would rival that of both the EU and NATO, due to Western encirclement.¹³²

While President Putin has clearly iterated his desire for a Eurasian Community to rival that of the EU, neither the EEC nor the CIS is anywhere close to doing so. However, the economic and military apparatus is already in place, while talks of currency and military unions are planned.¹³³ In sum, NATO effectively set the stage for a resurgent Russia to seek a center of influence of its own. Further, since NATO's rapid expansionism, paired with that of the EU, largely claimed most of the prime real estate, including former Soviet Republics, Russia will be forced to create its center of influence by force, as evidenced by the Russian military actions in both Georgia and Ukraine.

The Future of NATO: A Stronger Europe

On Russia's neo-imperial project, with potential targets such as eastern Ukraine, Moldova, Georgia, and Central Asia in play, a European response is required. This thesis has shown that NATO has effectively transformed itself since the fall of the Berlin Wall, as evidenced by the evolution of the Strategic Concept, most notably in 1991, 1999, and 2010. While its evolution from territorial security to out-of-area operations highlights NATO's effectiveness in a post-Cold War security environment as a success, its expansion as a political alliance only served to create a new Russian threat. NATO's emphasis on rapid expansionism in order to create a greater alliance has effectively encircled Russia and presented the West as interfering in the traditionally Russian area of influence. Further, NATO has already proven unwilling to act on solely European territorial interests due to the alliance's current burden sharing agreement. As such,

¹³² Mark Kramer, "Russian Policy Toward the Commonwealth of Independent States," *Problems of Post-Communism* 55, no. 6 (2008): 4.

¹³³ *Ibid.*, 5.

Europe must take the reins for its own security and enact serious changes within its CFSP.

Upon permanently stationing American troops in Europe during the Korean War, General Dwight D. Eisenhower stated the American troops would provide, "...the needed active strength pending the time that the European nations can build up their own defense forces."¹³⁴ Now, in 2016, EU member states contribute to less than one-third of NATO defense expenditures, while only two EU member states contribute 2 percent of GDP to their military budget.¹³⁵ The burden-sharing debate once again comes to light, with Europe not pulling the weight of defending its own borders. As evidenced by the war in Bosnia, the war in Kosovo, the Russian occupation of Georgia, and the Russian annexation of Crimea, the EU constantly finds itself unwilling and unable to act against external acts of aggression on its periphery.¹³⁶ The EU effectively adopted NATO as its military arm, and sits back and accepts when NATO is unwilling to act directly against Russia, as in the annexation of Crimea. The EU must enact changes to its CFSP so that it effectively controls and pays for its own territorial defense. On the 200,000 lives lost during the Bosnian War, it was stated, "...events in Bosnia-Herzegovina have put Europe entirely to shame and betrayed a powerlessness to intervene on the part of Europe's security organizations as a whole."¹³⁷ European military dependence on NATO, and thus the United States, undermines their incentive to create a workable infrastructure for a common defense entity.

¹³⁴ Ted Galen Carpenter, *The Future of NATO* (London: Frank Cass, 1995), 125.

¹³⁵ Darrell Driver, "Burden Sharing and the Future of NATO: Wandering Between Two Worlds," *Defense and Security Analysis* 32, no. 1 (2016): 9

¹³⁶ *Ibid.*, 128.

¹³⁷ Ted Galen Carpenter, *The Future of NATO* (London: Frank Cass, 1995), 128

The Maastricht Treaty, the founding document of the EU, laid the foundation for the EU's CFSP and the eventual creation of a common defense policy. At NATO's January 1994 summit, the closing remarks stated on a common European defense entity," ...that it might in time lead to a common defense compatible with that of the alliance."¹³⁸ The Western EU (WEU), founded in the Maastricht Treaty, was intended to be the EU's security dimension. In 2009, the WEU was absorbed by the CFSP- a mechanism for adopting common principles and guidelines on political and security issues, committing to common diplomatic approaches, and undertaking joint actions.¹³⁹ The Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP) is the operations arm of the CFSP, and encompasses both military and civilian aspects of defense. It must be noted, that the Lisbon Treaty recognizes NATO as the primary actor in the EU's defense, and only views the CSDP as a capability for the EU to act in cases where an EU intervention is more effective, or in situations where NATO or the UN choose not to become involved.¹⁴⁰ However, this makes it seem as if the EU's CSDP possesses a core set of capabilities which would enable it to act in the absence of NATO in either conventional or expeditionary war scenarios, but this is simply not the case.

CSDP missions utilize the "battlegroup" as the common war fighting entity. These EU battlegroups are rapidly deployable, multinational battlegroups capable of military support, peacekeeping, and rule-of-law operations.¹⁴¹ An EU Battlegroup is currently operational in Kosovo with the EU Rule of Law Mission. This mission focuses

¹³⁸ Ibid., 135.

¹³⁹ Mix, Derek, "The EU: Foreign and Security Policy," (Congressional Research Service, Washington D.C., August 15th, 2011).

¹⁴⁰ Andrew Michta, "Dealing with Russia: A New 2020 Vision?" in *The Future of NATO: Regional Defense and Global Security*, eds Andrew Michta and Paal Hilde (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2014), 58-59.

¹⁴¹ Mix, Derek, "The EU: Foreign and Security Policy," (Congressional Research Service, Washington D.C., August 15th, 2011).

on creating functioning civilian legal institutions. The EU Force Althea functions in Bosnia with a police-training function, while the EU Border Assistance Mission to Ukraine and Moldova provides security and customs consulting. Two current Battlegroups are conducting reform and police training missions in the Congo, while training missions are in progress in Somalia. EU Battlegroups have concluded missions in Macedonia, Georgia, Africa, and the Middle East.¹⁴²

These EU Battlegroups, at best, have contributed lightly to international security. While the EU is contributing in that these tasks may have fallen to either NATO or the UN to complete, these missions are not military in nature and are thus not contributing to the desperately needed future war fighting function of the CFSP. Further, European militaries face declining military budgets, while major shortfalls exist in both in technology and capability. Now, more than 10 years after the launch of the CSDP, the EU is no closer to maintaining its own powerful common military infrastructure. Without NATO, the EU is unable to defend its borders. Further, as mentioned during the burden sharing discussion, this reliance on the US to fund NATO makes the US the de facto leader of NATO. Thus, in situations where the US is not interested in directly addressing Russia, such as with the annexation of Crimea, the EU has no capability with which to address Russia itself. That is, the US is not willing to militarily address Russia over Ukraine, while Ukraine is of great importance to the EU. Thus, the EU is unable to effectively address its own territorial integrity because it is not in the best interests of NATO. EU Battlegroups are in no way able to be used for territorial defense of the EU. Thus, the EU must make effective changes to its CFSP so that a common military infrastructure can be built, and a common pool of resources created.

¹⁴² Ibid.

Conclusion

This thesis argued that NATO is still an effective political and military alliance in the post-Cold War security environment. The successful evolution of NATO, as evidenced by the 1991, 1999, and 2010 Strategic Concept documents showed that the alliance changed its mission appropriately as its external threats changed. However, the political end of the alliance faltered with its rapid expansionism, which ultimately led to the resurgent Russian threat. Further, unsuccessful attempts, since the alliance's inception, at forcing Europe to share the burden of financing NATO also failed. The implications of a disproportionate burden sharing alliance places decision making power firmly in the hands of the entity making the largest contribution. Thus, the US successfully controls decision making in the alliance, even though the alliance deals mostly with European conditions. In spite of these failings, however, NATO must remain the pillar of international security architecture.

NATO, as a military alliance, has proven itself valuable, but has also proven itself unwilling to address European territorial integrity concerns such as illegal assertions of Russian aggression due to the current burden sharing arrangement. The US' influence on NATO makes the alliance unwilling to directly address Russia with force due to a seemingly insignificant annexation of Crimea or of the Georgian territories of South Ossetia and Abkhazia. In order for NATO to be used for the territorial defense of Europe, the EU must assume a deeper role in the regional security of the continent. Thus, NATO should transform over the coming years, and integrate much of its structure within the EU's CSDP. Over time, the CSDP should envelop most of NATO's military infrastructure, with the EU possessing a common pool of military assets and a common

military command structure. The EU has no real crisis response force that it can utilize to defend against Russian aggression without NATO.

In order for Europe to effectively respond to Russian territorial threats on its periphery, the EU must be able to act in a unilateral military manner. External pressures placed on Europe's eastern periphery are shaped by the intricacies of the Eastern European geostrategic space. Belarus, Transnistria, Crimea, Abkhazia and South Ossetia, Armenia, and the Baltic States all pose deeply rooted, historical enclaves of Russian influence.¹⁴³ Thus, the issue of an assertive Russian foreign policy is only likely to grow in the future. While it is obvious that the EU's new, reformulated CSDP will not include the military assets of large non-EU member states, most notably the US and Turkey, those assets would still be available in the event of Article V operations.

Future areas of study should include the expansion of the EU's CFSP, to include a common pool of military assets and a common military infrastructure. This examination should focus on the purposeful evolution of the EU Battlegroup structure to build a ready force capable of delivering hard power to an enemy state. The EU should capitalize on the existing infrastructure of NATO in order to leverage common European military resources, an existing command structure, and proven warfighting tactics. A strong EU with a CFSP that enables it to defend its borders is the first step toward combatting the neo-imperial Russian threat.

¹⁴³ Fyodor Lukyanov, "Russia-EU: The Partnership that Went Astray," *Europe-Asia Studies* 60, no. 6 (2008): 1116.

Chapter Three

The EU: A Common Foreign and Security Policy to Effectively Deter the Russian Threat

The security dilemma present between NATO and Russia in the post-Cold War security environment is the result of decades of escalatory policies formulated erroneously by the West via the Deterrence Model instead of the Spiral Model. NATO has failed in its deterrence of Russia's ascent as a regional power and there is no reason to believe that NATO can be an effective deterrent to Russia in the future; the failure of NATO to react to Russian aggression effectively in Georgia, Crimea, and eastern Ukraine has proven to be the linchpin in the total loss of NATO as a Russian deterrent. This paper will argue that the EU's CFSP presents itself as the most viable alternative to NATO as a suitable Russian deterrent for the future. From a Neorealist perspective, the EU is able to avoid the intricacies of NATO-styled security dilemma with Russia, as the growth of its CFSP can be effectively signaled as a defensive mechanism. Further, the EU is able to mitigate its current integration dilemma with Russia by reformulating its expansion policies and its Eastern Partnership Program (EaP). These two actions will enable the CFSP to act as a successful deterrent for aggressive Russian actions on Europe's periphery as Europe will avoid a security dilemma while effectively removing the cause of its current integration dilemma with Russia.

Before the EU can successfully deter the resurgent Russian threat in the post-Cold War security environment, it must work to address two significant issues that underwrite any security policy. First, the EU must purposefully push the evolution of its strategic culture to allow for its member states to accept the EU's use of hard power for realpolitik

reasons, as well as for crisis response operations in support of the Petersberg Tasks. Second, the EU must use the European Defense Agency (EDA) to push member states to fund and modernize their forces that the “pooling and sharing” concept realizes the acquisition of key strategic capabilities that the EU is currently lacking. Should the EU create an effective strategic culture that utilizes both hard and soft power to accomplish both Petersberg Tasks and realpolitik missions, while utilizing the EDA to effectively modernize and equip the EU’s fighting forces with key strategic capabilities, the EU’s CFSP will be able to act as a credible alternative to the failed NATO-Russian relationship and thus provide an effective deterrent against Russia. Should the EU wish to see aggressive Russian foreign policy and unlawful Russian military action cease in its periphery, it must endeavor to become the key security actor that engages with Russia; NATO, and thus the US, has been unable to effectively formulate policy via the Deterrence Model, causing the current NATO-Russia security dilemma. The EU is the only viable alternative to successfully deter aggressive Russian foreign policy and further military action on the EU’s borders.

The EU: An Evolving Strategic Culture

Strategic culture consists of socially transmitted, identity-derived norms, ideas, and habits that are shared among the most influential actors and social groups within a given community, which help to shape a ranked set of options for a community’s pursuit of security and defense goals.¹⁴⁴ These “norms,” are deeply ingrained views and perceptions about of a political entity’s proper role in the world, how states interact appropriately in the international community, and how security is ideally achieved. These

¹⁴⁴ Christoph O. Meyer, “The Purpose and Pitfalls of Constructivist Forecasting: Insights from Strategic Culture Research for the EU’s Evolution as a Military Power,” *International Studies Quarterly* 55 (2011): 677.

“habits” can be defined as internalized processes of discussing (population), deciding (government), and acting (military) on security matters.¹⁴⁵ An entity’s strategic culture can be separated into 4 dimensions: acceptable goals for the use of force, how force is applied (specifically referring to minimizing collateral damage), state actions within the structure of the international community (unilateral or multilateral actor), and to what extent a nation requires internal or external authorization for the use of force. Further, discussion on the strategic culture of the EU must take into account the multiple actors in play. On one side are the EU institutions, strategic documents, and key position holders on the supranational level. On the other side are the member states of the EU, taking into account the prevailing strategic cultures of the key EU member states. An important tertiary actor for security in Europe will always be the European citizens, as centuries of destructive multipolarity have affected the collective memory of the population and instilled a general negative opinion on military operations, which affects both the strategic cultures of member-states as well as the overall strategic culture of the EU.

A security strategy is typically the foundation of an entity’s strategic culture, which will lay out goals, threat perception, and a defined strategy for addressing these threats. While the EU authored its European Security Strategy (ESS) in 2003, the mere presence of such a document does not indicate that the EU possesses a strategic culture. The EU is, however, actively discovering its strategic culture, even if this is not wholly reflected in this strategic document. The ESS introduced a policy of “soft model hard

¹⁴⁵ Christoph O. Meyer, “The Purpose and Pitfalls of Constructivist Forecasting: Insights from Strategic Culture Research for the EU’s Evolution as a Military Power,” *International Studies Quarterly* 55 (2011): 677.

power,” which has not yet been achieved.¹⁴⁶ Currently, the EU is a predominantly civilian security power that does not have the political will to use assertive military power that harnesses expeditionary warfare in pursuit of clearly delineated strategic interests.¹⁴⁷ It is important to recognize that the constraints of the liberal, democratic politics of the EU will never allow for Europe to become a security actor akin to the United States. Before Brexit, the EU had two member states with the political will to conduct expeditionary, out of area operations. However, with the exit of the United Kingdom (UK) in 2016, France is now left as the only member state that has both the drive and capacity to pursue expeditionary style warfare that brings “the fight” to the enemy before it reaches Europe’s doorstep. Now that the UK is gone, Germany will inevitably have a larger voice in security, which brings with it severe restraint, an ingrained sense of multilateralism, and the requirement of a UN Mandate for any security operations. Further, “the neutrals,” such as Ireland and Austria, paired with “the exceptions,” such as Denmark, prove that there is a clear lack of political will for military operations within Europe. For this reason, it will not be possible for the EU to become a “normal” security actor. Due to the legacy of destructive multi-polarity over the centuries, and a recent history of precarious integration, the development of a strategic culture that ties in the unabated “use of force” in the traditional sense is not likely to occur. As a result, the EU’s strategic culture has developed on the basis of “human security.”

The ESS focused on a rules-based order with a foundation in multi-lateralism and the protection of human rights. The EU recognizes the fundamental framework for

¹⁴⁶ Janne Haaland Matlary, “When Soft Power Turns Hard: Is an EU Strategic Culture Possible?” *Security Dialogue* 37, no. 1 (2006): 106.

¹⁴⁷ Christoph O. Meyer, “The Purpose and Pitfalls of Constructivist Forecasting: Insights from Strategic Culture Research for the EU’s Evolution as a Military Power,” *International Studies Quarterly* 55 (2011): 675.

international relations as the UN Charter, and thus the EU focuses on the UN as the lead organization for international security.¹⁴⁸ The term, “human security” refers to a new notion that a state’s focus should be on an individual person and their right to security. Thus, the focus is defending human rights, and not territorial rights. “Human security” has its foundations on the report on International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) and the 2004 Barcelona Report. In both documents, the EU laid a foundation for the responsibility to protect individuals when a state fails to protect them or causes them harm. The ICISS stated that,

...where a population is suffering serious harm, as a result of internal war, insurgency, repression or state failure, and the state in question is unable or unwilling to halt or avert it, the principle of non-intervention yields to the international responsibility to protect.¹⁴⁹

The Barcelona Report and the ICISS go even further and state that the ESS should be based on human rights, clear political authority, multilateralism, a bottom-up approach, regional focus, the use of legal instruments, and the appropriate use of force.¹⁵⁰ The UN also ramped up its emphasis on human security in its document, “A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility.”¹⁵¹ Thus, the international community is morally required to intervene in failed states with military capacity on the basis on human security.

Taking it one step further, the UN places primacy on civil-military integration, based on harsh lessons learned from such operations in the 1990s and 2000s. In the event that hard power should be necessary due to a violation of human rights, the EU would conduct crisis response military operations followed by a shift to civilian operations as

¹⁴⁸ Janne Haaland Matlary, “When Soft Power Turns Hard: Is an EU Strategic Culture Possible?” *Security Dialogue* 37, no. 1 (2006), 1

¹⁴⁹ Ibid., 116.

¹⁵⁰ Ibid.

¹⁵¹ Julia Schmidt, “The EU-UN Partnership in Light of the Responsibility to Protect,” in *The EU, Strategy and Security Policy*, ed. Laura Chappell, Jocelyn Mawdsley, and Petar Petrov (London: Routledge, 2016), 135.

quickly as practicable. This notion, coined the “right to protect,” (R2P) is the premise for the use of military force in crisis response operations due to genocide, ethnic cleansing, war crimes, or crimes against humanity. R2P requires the UN Security Council to authorize the use of force ahead of military actions. Thus, the emphasis on R2P forces any military action to be authorized by an international institutional (UN) that would be in response to a R2P function, and not in response to traditional “power grabs” that would be seen in conventional warfare.¹⁵² In an international system focused on multilateral institutions, regional powers are tasked with the collective or shared responsibility to protect populations from serious harm in the event a territorial state causes its population harm or is unwilling or unable to respond to harm being caused to its population.

In recent decades, crisis management and Peace Support Operations (PSOs) have become the norm in order to compel states to stop doing harm within their borders. Nation-states must now act so that spillover activities do not occur that drag their state into another’s internal conflicts. Thus, the EU will be a strategic actor based on human rights, democracy, and the rule of law. According to Hyde-Price, an EU strategic culture will have to take into account coercion and not brute force, legitimate force based on multilateral agreements, a just motivation, and limited collateral damage.¹⁵³ The EUs current ESS focuses on “prevention” of conflict through its soft power toolbox. In terms of legitimacy, the EU is both well-suited and well-positioned to be regarded as a legitimate security actor. Since the EU is a laws and norms based international actor with a focus on multi-lateralism and institutions, the EU and the UN naturally land in stride.

¹⁵² Julia Schmidt, “The EU-UN Partnership in Light of the Responsibility to Protect,” in *The EU, Strategy and Security Policy*, ed. Laura Chappell, Jocelyn Mawdsley, and Petar Petrov (London: Routledge, 2016), 135.

¹⁵³ Adrian Hyde-Price, “‘Normative’ Power Europe: A Realist Critique,” *Journal of European Public Policy* 13, no. 2 (2006): 230-231.

The ESS demands a multi-lateral process before the use of force. While it doesn't demand a UN mandate, that would be preferred. Thus, the legitimate use of force for the EU's CFSP would be a UN mandate, or, at the very least, a consensus within the EU, for a R2P military operation.

While this development of strategic culture works for the type of small scale, civilian based PSOs the EU currently conducts around the world, it will not be able to develop to support a CFSP that needs both hard and soft power capability to deal with the type of crises the EU has seen in Bosnia, Kosovo, Libya, Georgia, and Ukraine. Without continued evolution in the field of strategic culture, the EU will continue to stand on the sidelines while NATO/US take the lead on security issues on Europe's periphery. The EU must move forward with using R2P and the human security concept as the foundation for the development of hard power capabilities that the EU can harness to protect its citizens from the spillover of failed/failing states and from aggressive, regional powers. Most importantly, the EU's strategic culture will need to evolve from a more pacifist and defensive-minded one toward a culture that accepted a more "robust" use of military force for realpolitik reasons, as well as for R2P.

The EU: An Emerging Security Actor

The previous section asserted that the EU has an embryonic strategic culture that is able to evolve into an effective strategic culture that utilizes both hard and soft power capability based on the principle of R2P, and, if need be, realpolitik. However, simply having an effective strategic culture is not enough to make an entity a successful strategic actor. A strategic actor must be able to threaten the use of force and then be able to

deploy that force when necessary, in order to achieve clearly defined and prioritized ends. This demands both a political will *and* a military capability.¹⁵⁴ While the R2P principle will likely evolve into a unifying strategic foundation for the CFSP as a whole, this does not automatically mean the EU is suddenly capable of conducting military operations for R2P. The EU must drive an overhaul of Europe's armed forces at the supranational level utilizing key CFSP institutions in order to successfully influence member states to expend the resources necessary to modernize, and to reverse Europe's trend of demilitarization.

As previously stated, an entity must be able to successfully utilize coercive diplomacy in order to be an effective security actor on the international stage. While coercive diplomacy is preferable to actually using force, an actor cannot reasonably expect to succeed in coercive diplomacy if that state does not have an effective force to use. Lidell Hart defined strategy as, "...the art of distributing and applying military means to fulfill the ends of policy."¹⁵⁵ Thus, a strategic actor can be defined as a state with a capacity for coercive diplomacy. Meyer argued that a strategic actor must have four characteristics:

- 1.) The ability to quickly mobilize a robust and versatile contingent of appropriate forces autonomous from the US across the globe
- 2.) For a range of different political purposes ranging from the humanitarian and peace support operations subsumed under the Petersberg tasks to out of area "preventative" military action against "terrorists" under the new solidarity clause
- 3.) The ability to conduct combat operations successfully against well-equipped adversaries and even in the face of high casualties
- 4.) The ability to sustain forces over a prolonged period of time to ensure military success¹⁵⁶

¹⁵⁴ Janne Haaland Matlary, "When Soft Power Turns Hard: Is an EU Strategic Culture Possible?," *Security Dialogue* 37, no. 1 (2006), 110.

¹⁵⁵ Christoph O. Meyer, "The Purpose and Pitfalls of Constructivist Forecasting: Insights from Strategic Culture Research for the EU's Evolution as a Military Power," *International Studies Quarterly* 55: 675.

¹⁵⁶ Ibid.

While the EU has certainly mastered the art of wielding its “soft power” through substantial carrots in both economic and political integration, it has been proven by events in Bosnia, Kosovo, and Libya that soft power only goes so far.

Europe’s military forces, since the end of the Cold War, have been plagued with declining defense budgets and the accompanying decrease in capability. Without a doubt, Europe must undergo a force transformation that addresses its personnel and equipment deficiencies. Since the 2007-2008 Euro Zone Crisis, European expenditures on defense have decreased. NATO’s targeted GDP spending of 2% has only been reached by a few European members of the alliance. What’s more, over 75% of any given European nation-state’s military expenditures are for personnel alone. This leaves only 25% of defense expenditures for equipment, infrastructure, and research & development.¹⁵⁷ There is currently no CSDP monetary “target” for defense expenditures, however; the NATO situation is a clear indicator that Europe has a long road ahead before it can be regarded as a strategic actor. Molling stated on the state of European armies,

...if Europe does not halt the rapid depletion of its defense resources, both the structure of its armed forces and its defense industry base will be turned upside down. At the end of this process, we will be left with the Europe that is incapable of defending its strategic interests outside of its own borders.¹⁵⁸

As previously stated, the US provided the EU with security guarantees during and after the Cold War, which enabled the EU to focus its resources, both political and economic, on the closer integration of the EU. As such, European states utilized their resources to build up the welfare state system and to create an integrated, single market with a single currency, but failed to effectively modernize their militaries and to maintain proficiency

¹⁵⁷ David Galbreath and Simon Smith, “Military Capabilities and Force Transformation,” in *The EU, Strategy and Security Policy*, ed by Laura Chappell, Jocelyn Mawdsley, and Petar Petrov (London: Routledge, 2016), 187-188.

¹⁵⁸ *Ibid.*, 189.

and basic capabilities. The topic of European “freeriding” in NATO is a constant complaint in the domestic politics of the US, as lawmakers continually push European nations to make the minimal “required” contribution of 2% of GDP to defense budgets.¹⁵⁹ This section will argue that European militaries are not only shrinking and in desperate need of funding for modernization, they are grossly ineffective, as a whole, due to disjointed modernization efforts and a lack of a common European capability set. In effect, there is no current European, interoperable pool of assets, there are simply separate military structures in each nation, with separate procurement processes for strategic equipment. As a result, the EU cannot be looked at as a strategic actor. In order to shift its rudder, the EU must first utilize the EDA to build consensus on European defense priorities so that funding is secured for the EU’s most needed capabilities. Further, the EDA must continue to craft a coherent European “pooling and sharing” policy that all member states agree to, so that it can very clearly delineate which nations are providing which key military assets for security operations in order to most effectively utilize Europe’s defense budgets.

The Cold War militaries of Europe were largely focused on territorial defense against Soviet Russia. In the post-Cold War security environment, a different set of tools is required to launch successful crisis response and PSOs. Thus, the EU was, and is, faced with the challenge of refocusing its efforts to quality over quantity in the personnel realm, and to refocus its defense assets from territorial defense to power projection and expeditionary capabilities. European nations first discovered how much their militaries had fallen behind during the first Gulf War. French forces, the premier European fighting force, found themselves with just 15,000 out of 289,000 deployable troops and 40 out of

¹⁵⁹ Ibid., 187.

1300 deployable combat tanks. Further, once they arrived in Saudi Arabia, the US had to outfit all of France's light armored vehicles with GPS, without which they would have been blind in the operational environment. Most of the French communications systems were not interoperable with the US and were badly in need of upgrading.¹⁶⁰

Less than six months later, the EU found itself unable to respond to the conflict in the Balkans, as it lacked the strategic transport even required to get European troops into theater because the US did not wish to be involved. Furthermore, had they gotten there, they would have had much the same experience as the French in Saudi Arabia. In all, the early 1990's unmasked an outdated European military that is not interoperable with US assets, a pitiful number of deployable troops and equipment, and a severe lack of strategic lift, command & control, and ISR capability. The self-defense capabilities of the Cold War provided the EU very little as far as the new post-Cold War security environment demanded- a high number of expeditionary forces outfitted with modernized, interoperable equipment, able to be air lifted into any theater in the world on very short notice. This is referred to as the 1990's dual "capabilities gap," referring to the growing gap between US and European military capability and the gap between existing EU systems and systems required for crisis response missions and PSOs.¹⁶¹

In 1992, the EU clearly defined "the Petersberg Tasks," as disarmament operations, humanitarian operations, advise and assist operations, conflict prevention and peacekeeping operations, crisis management operations, and anti-terrorism operations. In order to be able to accomplish these tasks, the EU began a transformation process in both military personnel and procurement. First, most European nations ended conscription and

¹⁶⁰ Jolyon Howorth, *Security and Defense Policy in the EU* (England: Palgrave MacMillan, 2014), 74.

¹⁶¹ Ibid., 75.

moved to build modern, all volunteer, professional military forces. The most important fact behind a professional fighting force was one that would be almost wholly deployable, and outside of the country's borders at that. Next, the EU focused on the severe capabilities gap between Europe and the US, and the totally disjointed military capability set between European nations as a whole. As previously mentioned, the EU successfully negotiated the "Berlin Plus" agreement in order to successfully procure strategic capabilities such as airlift and technical C4I items in order to gain capability while it began the procurement process for these highly costly strategic items. However, as the Berlin Plus agreements were never fully realized, the EU recognized it needed to expedite the procurement of these capabilities. Thus, this can be noted as the point in time where the EU recognized it would need its own military capability outside of the NATO structure.

The Helsinki Headline Goal (HHG) of 1999 was authored as a European "force catalogue" from which the EU would draw people and resources for its security operations. It identified 60,000 troops, 100 ships, and 400 aircraft as the force structure that would need to be deployed within 60 days and sustainable for an entire year.¹⁶² While it was a landmark that the EU would take the step to identify a required fighting force to meet policy goals, there were significant issues with the initial HHG. First, in 2000, it was estimated that only 15,000-20,000 troops from European nations could have been deployed at any given time. Second, the EU still did not possess strategic capabilities such as air lift, air to air refueling, combat search and rescue, headquarters capability, special operations, theater ballistic missiles and defense, unmanned aerial vehicles for ISR, and space capabilities. Further, there was no cohesive entity that was

¹⁶² Jolyon Howorth, *Security and Defense Policy in the EU* (England: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014), 79.

driving these requirements and gaining required funding to obtain these capabilities. Such a task required a top-down process, pooling and sharing, and possibly specialization. Thus, HHG 1999 evolved to HHG 2010. HHG 2010 focused on interoperability, deployability, and sustainability, as a result of the shortfalls identified in HHG 1999. As such, the EDA was established in 2004. What's more, the HHG 2010 labeled its goals as deployable "battle groups" by 2007, and interoperable C4I capabilities by 2010. HHG 2010 focused on 2,000 member battle group units capable of high intensity warfare in any environment and deployable within 15 days of notification.¹⁶³ Further, the EDA had Germany take the lead on strategic airlift, Spain on air-to-air refueling, the UK on headquarters capability, and the Netherlands on precision guided munitions for a fleet of F-16s.

Pooling and sharing has been identified as the EU's focus on achieving the strategic capabilities they identified as necessary in HHG 2010. In the age of declining military budgets, European nations waste much of their defense budgets on duplication of effort. For instance, Europe currently has 28 armies, 24 air forces, and 21 navies.¹⁶⁴ Further, France and Germany make up most of the defense expenditure for Europe as a whole; if the defense budgets of Italy, Spain, and the Netherlands are added to those of France and Germany, these budgets would make up a combined 80% of European defense budgets. The remaining 22 EU member states spend as much on defense, combined, as New Zealand. Thus, this budget issue makes pooling and sharing requirement if the EU wishes to possess hard power capabilities. As of 2017, European member nations funded and supported 178 different types of main battle tanks and

¹⁶³ Ibid., 81.

¹⁶⁴ Ibid., 85.

personnel carriers, 29 different types of naval vessels, and over 20 different types of fighter jets. By comparison, the US supports 1 main battle tank, less than 10 major types of naval vessels, and 6 fighter jets.¹⁶⁵ The duplication of efforts among EU military structures is extremely detrimental to the EU defense capability as a whole, while the extreme lack of defense spending in Europe as a whole threatens to nearly demilitarize the EU in the future. The opportunity cost of each nation developing and purchasing its own type of preferred strategic assets is tragic, while, compared to what is spent, the defense capabilities of European nations lag woefully behind the United States, even though Europe, as a whole, spends the second most on defense in the world.

In 2010, member states agreed to categorize their assets into 3 categories: national, pooled, and role/task sharing. Widely known as the “Ghent Framework,” this agreement began the pooling and sharing concept which was aimed at more effectively utilizing European defense budgets in order to achieve specific strategic capabilities and to provide the EU with deployable, modernized forces independent of NATO.¹⁶⁶ There are currently significant challenges to pooling and sharing. First, EU member states continue to make decisions on their current capabilities without regard to the EU as a whole. For instance, the Netherlands decommissioned all of its battle tanks in 2011, leaving Germany and France as the only nations left in Europe with this capability. In 2013, France significantly reduced the size of its Navy, taking away a key chunk of Europe’s frigate capability.¹⁶⁷ If European nations do not take into account the European capability as a whole, there is a possibility the EU may find itself without a specific

¹⁶⁵ EU, “Reflection Paper on the Future of European Defense,” (European Commission, Brussels, June 2017), 9.

¹⁶⁶ Jolyon Howorth, *Security and Defense Policy in the EU* (England: Palgrave MacMillan, 2014), 87.

¹⁶⁷ *Ibid.*, 88.

capability set in the future. Second, a lack of trust between nation states drives a lack of effort into specialization. For instance, if Spain owns all of Europe's air to air refueling assets, that may leave Germany fearful that a diplomatic standoff would leave Germany without the capability if it needed it for a security operation. For this reason, some member states continue to purchase their own assets, and thus leave less money for its identified EU capability set. This can be identified as a lingering nuance from centuries of European multipolarity.

As previously mentioned, the EDA was created to coordinate procurement and armaments cooperation and to then link capabilities to armaments production. Thus, the EDA is the single most important agency in connecting the EU's ESS (ends) to the capabilities of the member states (means). The stated objectives of the EDA are as follows:

- 1.) Contribute to identifying the Member States' military capability objectives and evaluating observance of capability commitments given by the Member States
- 2.) Promote harmonization of operational needs and adoption of effective, compatible procurement needs
- 3.) Propose multilateral projects to fulfil the objectives in terms of military capabilities, ensure coordination of the programmes implemented by the Member States and management of specific cooperation programmes
- 4.) Support defense technology research, and coordinate and plan joint research activities and the study of technical solutions meeting future operational needs
- 5.) Contribute to identifying and, if necessary, implementing any useful measure for strengthening the industrial and technological base of the defense sector and for improving the effectiveness of military expenditure¹⁶⁸

Since its inception, 26 defense ministers have agreed on 11 priority projects. In all of these projects, the EDA has acted as the interface between government, industry, and EU institutions to push forward. Further, the agency fosters cooperation in European defense through its "Steering Board," which gets all European defense ministers into a room

¹⁶⁸ Jolyon Howorth, *Security and Defense Policy in the EU* (England: Palgrave MacMillan, 2014), 91.

regularly.¹⁶⁹ This Steering Board has effectively gotten European nations to contextualize national requirement by framing them against the European framework. Thus, the EU can trigger, reinforce, and facilitate defense cooperation. Further, it can develop the framework for systemic cooperation and the joint development of technology and strategic capabilities.

While the EU is making great strides on becoming a strategic actor, it cannot currently be called one. The EDA, while an essential element in the eventual realization of an operational CFSP, has still not delivered essential strategic capabilities required of a professional, expeditionary, interoperable fighting force. The EU still has great strides to take in strategic lift, cyber, ISR, and logistics, among others. The Battlegroup concept, while technically fully operational, has yet to be tested in combat. Further, it is debatable how useful this force will be during actual operations around the globe. The EDA faces some challenges.

First, European nation-states are hesitant when they are urged to “specialize,” as this poses a risk to lose overall military capability that would enable self-defense, and thus, sovereignty. Second, nation-states are hesitant to rely on other nation-states for security.¹⁷⁰ Bottom line, European nations are still not funding their militaries as they need to, leading to small deployable personnel pools and lagging capabilities within Europe as a whole. However, the progress of the EDA thus far proves that EU is successfully endeavoring to become a strategic actor with a grand strategy, and will become a strategic actor in the future. What’s more, in 2017, the EU agreed on the

¹⁶⁹ Ibid., 95.

¹⁷⁰ David Galbreath and Simon Smith, “Military Capabilities and Force Transformation,” in *The EU, Strategy and Security Policy*, ed by Laura Chappell, Jocelyn Mawdsley, and Petar Petrov (London: Routledge, 2016), 196.

activation of Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO), a treaty-based framework and process to deepen the defense cooperation of EU member states through Coordinated Annual Reviews on Defense (CARD) conducted by the EDA. These reviews will seek to more closely align the national security strategies and national defense budgets of EU member states, and to inject the EU's security strategy and force needs into the greater discussion of member-nation defense requirements. Thus far, 25 nations have agreed on 17 strategic projects. The CARD process will also enable the European Defense Fund, managed by the EDA, to finance these some or all of these strategic projects. Ultimately, PESCO will allow the state of European defense to be more efficient by providing a platform for closer cooperation and collaboration.

It is important to recognize that, while the EU is currently not a strategic actor due to its inability to utilize coercive diplomacy, it is active on the international stage in a civilian capacity. Since 2011, the EU has deployed over 70,000 soldiers and civilians in support of over 34 CFSP operations around the globe.¹⁷¹ The EU, as a civilian actor, is highly specialized in stabilization and reconstruction operations. While all EU CFSP missions have been at the consent of the host nation, and have taken place in permissive or semi-permissive environments, CFSP missions have impacted regional security by promoting good governance and positively impacted stability within the EU's periphery.¹⁷² A brief overview of the EU's CFSP in action proves that the EU is capable of conducting larger scale crisis response and PSOs in the future, and even more realpolitik operations, should its strategic culture and military capability continue to evolve.

¹⁷¹ EU, "European Security and Defense: The Basics," (Pamphlet, Brussels, 2017).

¹⁷² Michael Merlingen, *EU Security Policy: What It Is, How it Works, Why it Matters* (London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2013), 127.

Under the CSDP, the EU seeks to manage crises, build the capacity of partner nations, and protect Europeans through both military and civilian means. The EU deploys to monitor borders, provide police and judicial expertise, dismantle human trafficking networks, disrupt flows of weapons, and train partners' security services.¹⁷³ Since 2003, there have been 34 CSDP missions in over 20 different countries. During military operations, the EU typically provides forces to train partner nations and to contribute to the security in post-conflict environments. In its civilian missions, the EU deploys legal experts, police, borders and customs officials, among others, to contribute to the rule of law in regions affected by crises.

EU CFSP operations in the West Balkans have contributed to stability in the region. A decade after the implosion of the former Yugoslavia, the EU deployed a mission to Bosnia, with missions shortly thereafter to both Macedonia and Kosovo. Military missions occurred in both Bosnia and Macedonia. In Bosnia, EUFOR Althea deployed in 2004 to take over for the UN Stabilization Force. However, most of the EU personnel had already been active participants in the UN mission, while the EU merely accepted responsibilities for the UN assets or utilized NATO assets already in the region. EUFOR Althea focused on preventing parties from spoiling peace in the region, by focusing on organized crime and hunting down war criminals.¹⁷⁴ In 2003, the EU launched EUFOR Concordia, which was a 3500 strong force deployed to Macedonia to prevent civil war from breaking out between ethnic Albanians and Slav-Macedonians after the Kosovo Crisis. Civilian missions and the accompanying security sector reforms in Bosnia (EUPM Bosnia) and Macedonia (EUPOL Proxima) endeavored to build strong

¹⁷³ EU, "European Security and Defense: The Basics," (Pamphlet, Brussels, 2017).

¹⁷⁴ Michael Merlingen, *EU Security Policy: What It Is, How it Works, Why it Matters* (London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2013), 131.

and impartial police forces to build stability in the multi-ethnic societies.¹⁷⁵ In 2008, the EU deployed to Kosovo with EULEX Kosovo in order to promote the rule of law after the nation declared its independence. This civilian mission is the largest mission in the EU's history, and focused on the construction of an independent and multiethnic justice and law enforcement system in Kosovo. In 2004, the EU deployed EUJUST Themis to Georgia as an effort to bring the South Caucasus into the realm of liberal democracy and rule of law. Very specifically chosen experts were sent to Georgia to work with local officials to conduct reforms in the judicial system and criminal justice system.¹⁷⁶ In 2008, the EU deployed EUMM Georgia in response to the frozen conflicts with Russia in both South Ossetia and Abkhazia. The EU sent over 200 peace monitors to Georgia to supervise the withdrawal of Russian troops from Georgia proper.¹⁷⁷ The monitoring force also focused on the movement of civilians and arms shipments, kidnappings, and other post-conflict issues.

In short, the EU has demonstrated the capacity to send Europeans around the globe in small scale military and both small and large scale civilian operations under the CFSP umbrella. While many scholars argue that the EU has actually accomplished very little in these missions, as most were simply a continuation of either UN or NATO missions, while the EU simply took over the same UN or NATO equipment, and thus merely took over an existing operation without doing any of the tough legwork. Further, all EU CFSP operations have been conducted at the request of the host nation, while the EU has never conducted forced entry operations. What's more, the EU has conducted far

¹⁷⁵ Ibid., 133-134.

¹⁷⁶ Michael Merlingen, *EU Security Policy: What It Is, How it Works, Why it Matters* (London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2013), 136-137.

¹⁷⁷ Ibid., 141-142.

more civilian missions than military missions. Critics argue that the EU missions have such a narrow mandate that CSDP missions have not had a significant impact on the security situation in the world as a whole.¹⁷⁸ However, the EU's military and civilian CFSP missions prove that the EU is gradually evolving its strategic culture while emerging as a security actor. Its military missions, however small and however amenable the environment, are allowing the EU to show its member nations that hard power capabilities are required to have a positive impact on its periphery. What's more, the exposure to NATO and UN military equipment exposes member nations to their need for a modernized force. Through its civilian missions, the EU is proving to the world that it possesses a much-needed capability that, as of late, the US has shown it does not possess. Further the EU missions to the Balkans and Caucuses prove that the EU is interested in becoming more than a by standing in the security affairs in its periphery, and that it is interested in becoming a full-fledged security provider in order to prevent these conflict from occurring in the first place.

CFSP Implications on the Western Security Dilemma with Russia

This paper has argued that the EU's CFSP is currently ineffective due to a weak strategic culture and the lack of a meaningful European military capacity. However, the EU's strategic culture may be described as evolving; the foundation of CFSP operations is built on R2P, but the EU has demonstrated the will to develop a hard power toolbox and incorporate more of a will for realpolitik operations. Further, while the EU is currently not a strategic actor due to the state of the overall European military capacity, the EDA has proven that European cooperation on acquiring required strategic

¹⁷⁸ Michael Merlingen, *EU Security Policy: What It Is, How it Works, Why it Matters* (London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2013), 178.

capabilities is workable, while the pooling and sharing concept is being valued by European nation states in order to close the capabilities gap. For these reasons, the EU's CFSP will evolve into an effective security policy and thus will be able to more successfully deter Russia than NATO. As previously discussed, NATO and Russia are currently engaged in a security dilemma driven by policies formulated via the Spiral Model, as proven by the occupation of Georgia in 2008, the annexation of Crimea in 2014, and the current frozen war in the Donbass region of eastern Ukraine. The West (US/NATO) are largely to blame for this security dilemma, as the policy formulated via the Deterrence Model did not successfully signal defensive intentions to Russia, triggering an aggressive Russian response formulated via the Spiral Model.

This section will argue that NATO-Russian relations are past the point of no return and that the EU, with its CFSP, will be able to effectively deter Russia in the future. First, the EU and Russia are not currently experiencing a security dilemma, but an integration dilemma that can be ended should the EU effectively signal the end of its association agreements with Ukraine, Moldova, and Georgia. Further, the effort should be followed up with an effort to allow Russia's "inner abroad" to interact with both Russia and the West, at least on the economic front, if not the political front as well. Second, Russia and the EU are delicately connected via the economy, most notably, through energy. Thus, Russia and the EU have a forceful driver for cooperation that will not end at any point in the foreseeable future. Lastly, allowing the EU to take responsibility for combatting Russia as a rival regional power will allow the US to conduct "offshore balancing," which would force the EU to provide for its own defense and allow the US to take a back seat and thus preserve its status as a global hegemon and

focus elsewhere. Thus, the EU, for the foreseeable future, is much better suited to deter aggressive Russian foreign policy than the US/NATO, while this course of action would allow the US to escape the security dilemma with Russia and to allow the EU to expend the resources necessary to deter Russia so that the US can focus its resources elsewhere.

Russia and the EU: Integration Dilemma

While many would present the war in Georgia and the conflict in Ukraine a measure of a new, aggressive Russian foreign policy, the West has a large role to play in provoking recent Russian actions on the international stage. The unchecked enlargement of both the EU and NATO in the post-Cold war security environment effectively resulted in the encirclement of Russia.¹⁷⁹ This expansionist policy was the result of the West's use of the Deterrence Model instead of the Spiral Model, as discussed in Chapter One of this portfolio. Thus, the post-Cold War security dilemma with Russia is a result of unchecked integration as a result of the use of the Deterrence Model, which was interpreted by Russia as being offensive, and not defensive, in nature. This section will argue that, while the NATO-Russian relationship is beyond repair due to the mission of NATO and its de facto US control, the EU-Russian relationship is not beyond repair. The EU, should it decide to check its Eastern Partnership Program (EaP) and the accompanying Association Agreements, would be able to escape the integration dilemma with Russia and avoid a future security dilemma with Russia, unlike NATO.

Charap and Troitsky deemed that the EU and Russia face an integration dilemma, which is a variant of the security dilemma focused on the exclusivity of membership in

¹⁷⁹ Safak Oguz, "NATO's Mistakes that Paved the Way for the Russia-Ukraine Crisis," *Bahar* 45 (2015), 2.

the EU. Essentially, nation-states in Russia's heterogeneous and "inner abroad" face the decision to either choose the West or Russia- a zero sum game.¹⁸⁰ They stated,

...one state perceives as a threat to its own security or prosperity its neighbors' integration into military alliances or economic groupings that are closed to it. This exclusivity is the source of the dilemma: its transforms integration, a positive-sum process by definition, into a zero-sum game for the state that is excluded from the integration initiatives offered to its neighbors. As with the security dilemma, the intentions of the neighbors or the backers of the integration initiatives need not be hostile to the state in question for an integration dilemma to materialize.¹⁸¹

While NATO expansion clearly represents a classic security dilemma due to the very mission of the organization, expansion of the EU is actually different in nature.¹⁸² In 2003, the EU unveiled its European Neighborhood Policy (ENP), which focuses on neighbors to the south and east. This policy hopes to cultivate a "ring of friends" directly around the EU that are interested in closer cooperation with the EU through political, economic, and institutional reform. This policy encompasses Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Syria, Tunisia, Palestine, Georgia, Moldova, Ukraine, Azerbaijan, Armenia, and Belarus. Russia opted to not be involved in the ENP in 2004.¹⁸³ In response to the Georgian war in 2008, the EU launched the Eastern Partnership Initiative (EaP), an integrative framework for enhancing the political and economic integration with six former Soviet satellite states: Belarus, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Moldova, Georgia, and Ukraine.¹⁸⁴ However, unlike NATO, the EaP has not developed as a total zero sum game as did NATO integration. Belarus, while an EaP member, is

¹⁸⁰ S. Charap and M. Troitskly, "Russia, the West, and the Integration Dilemma," *Survival* 55, no. 6 (2013): 50.

¹⁸¹ Ibid.

¹⁸² Simon Duke and Carmen Gebhard, "The EU and NATO's Dilemmas with Russia and the Prospects for Deconfliction," *European Security* 26, no. 3 (2017): 391.

¹⁸³ Anna-Sophie Maass, *EU-Russia Relations, 1999-2015* (London: Routledge, 2017), 64.

¹⁸⁴ Ibid., 137-138.

wholly committed to an alignment Russia and has little tolerance for most of the normative values the EU stands for, as does Azerbaijan.¹⁸⁵

The EU integration dilemma focuses largely on Ukraine, Moldova, and Georgia. For Russia, Ukrainian, Moldovan, and Georgian accession to the EU is a zero sum game and thus a direct alternative to closer ties with Russia, as Russia has real and present interests in these nations. For example, the Ukrainian prospect of an association agreement in 2010 likely prompted Russia to take military action in Ukraine. Russia has several meaningful military bases in the country, most notably the naval base in Sevastopol which is home to the Black Sea fleet, missile sites, and radar sites. As previously mentioned, eastern Ukraine contains a large population of ethnic Russians, while the Transnistrian territory in Moldova and the breakaway territories in both Abkhazia and South Ossetia do as well. Thus, association agreements, as a result of the EaP, for these three nations pose a direct threat to Russia's "inner abroad" and thus encroach on its sphere of influence. To Russia, this posed a zero-sum game and was unacceptable. Furthermore, Russia has effectively signaled this to the West for decades, except these signals have gone unheeded by the EU.

Unlike NATO's security dilemma, which results in efforts to bolster security by one party met by reciprocal reactions on the other, the EU's integration dilemma is able to be deconflicted. EaP states do not have to be involved in a zero-sum game of integration. The EU should end association agreements with these nations, and allow them to exist as non-aligned states with varying degrees of bilateral cooperation with the EU. The reasons for expanding the EU to include even more former Soviet Republics are

¹⁸⁵ Simon Duke and Carmen Gebhard, "The EU and NATO's Dilemmas with Russia and the Prospects for Deconfliction," *European Security* 26, no. 3 (2017): 387.

weak, while opting to push forward with these association agreements will draw even more dividing lines in Europe. Moldova, Georgia, Ukraine, Belarus, Armenia, and Azerbaijan should be looked at as a shared neighborhood.

Russia and the EU: Economic Cooperation

Second, Europe is uniquely able to cooperate more closely with Russia than, say, the US or NATO, due to intense economic interdependence. The EU is currently Moscow's largest trading partner, with energy at the backbone of this relationship. Europe is currently the world's largest importer of energy, with 80% of its energy supply coming from fossil fuels; 50% of total European energy consumed is imported. Russia currently supplies 40% of the EU's gas and 30% of the EU's oil supply.¹⁸⁶ 60% of Russian exports go to the EU, with 60% of those exports as energy. 90% of Russia's natural gas exports go to the EU, while over 60% of Russian crude oil makes its way to Europe as well.¹⁸⁷ Declining gas outputs in the North Sea will force the EU to become even more reliant on Russian natural gas in the future, as the North Sea continues to decline in output. It is estimated that by 2025, Europe will only be able to meet 25% of its own natural gas demand.¹⁸⁸ In all, between 75-80% of Russian export revenues are directly linked to the EU. Thus, the EU and Russia are severely dependent on each other; Europe requires Russian energy to operate their economy while Russia relies on the EU's massive energy imports to finance theirs. What's more, energy is the only sector within the Russian economy that is reasonably efficient. Russia's only other credible exports are arms and minerals. Russia's dependence on the export of raw materials stems from its

¹⁸⁶ Tom Casier, "The Rise of Energy to Top of the EU-Russia Agenda: From Interdependence to Dependence?," *Geopolitics* 16 (2011): 542.

¹⁸⁷ Ibid.

¹⁸⁸ Christophe-Alexandre Paillard, "Russia and Europe's Mutual Energy Dependence," *Journal of International Affairs* 63, no. 2 (2010): 69.

economic backwardness during the Soviet era.¹⁸⁹ Russia does not have the infrastructure, labor, money, or time in place to diversify its export portfolio to Asia, in order to tap into China's massive need for oil and natural gas. China is also utilizing coal before gas and oil, thus making the prospect of a similar relationship between Russia and China small.¹⁹⁰ Thus, while it is unlikely for Russia's economy to undergo the diversification needed to move away from energy as its primary contributor to GDP, it is also just as unlikely for the EU to either acquire its energy from other sources in the immediate future. Of note, renewable energy currently only makes up 6% of Europe's total energy supply, while nuclear power currently accounts for 15%, but will decline significantly in the coming years as almost every nation but France moves away from nuclear energy.¹⁹¹

European states rely on Russian gas at varying levels. Germany is the most reliant on Russian energy, with the Nord Stream pipeline running from Russian directly to Germany. Germany's "special relationship" with Russia has been dually noted and criticized by many eastern European nations who believe that this reliance on Russian energy forces Germany to be "weak" in terms of responding to aggressive Russian foreign policy. The "newer" European member states rely almost wholly on Russian energy inputs. Estonia, Lithuania, Latvia, and Poland are almost 100% dependent, while Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, and Slovakia are highly dependent.¹⁹² Non-nuclear Western European states, such as Germany and Italy, rely on Russian imports for approximately 30% and 28% of their energy, respectively. France relies on Russia the

¹⁸⁹Chistophe-Alexandre Paillard, "Russia and Europe's Mutual Energy Dependence," *Journal of International Affairs* 63, no. 2 (2010): 71.

¹⁹⁰ Ibid., 74.

¹⁹¹ Oliver Geden, Clemence Marcelis, and Andreas Maurer, "Perspectives for the EU's External Energy Policy," (Working Paper FG 1, 2006, Berlin), 5-6.

¹⁹² Tom Casier, "The Rise of Energy to Top of the EU-Russia Agenda: From Interdependence to Dependence?," *Geopolitics* 16 (2011): 542.

least out of powerful western European nations, largely as a result of its excellent network of nuclear facilities, which make up over 40% of France's total energy supply. Further, easy delivery from suppliers in the MENA region due to geographical location also makes diversification easier for France.¹⁹³ While Ukraine is currently not a member of NATO or the EU, it plays a vital role in the delivery of energy, most notably, natural gas, to European nations. Currently, 78% of all European natural gas travels through Ukraine, which is identified as a "transit nation."¹⁹⁴ For Ukraine, and other former Soviet Republics, energy is largely subsidized, making most former Soviet Republics completely dependent on Russian energy. As a result, Russia has utilized energy as a tool of coercive diplomacy in order to exact a preferred response from a nation when it disagreed with their foreign policy.¹⁹⁵ For instance, Russia has cut Ukraine off from its energy supply both in 2006 and 2009. Thus, Russian utilizes energy as either a "reward" or "punishment" for its former republics based on their behavior on the international stage.¹⁹⁶

While the NATO-Russian security dilemma is largely beyond repair due to decades of mistrust and policy formulated via the Spiral Model on both sides, the integration dilemma between the EU and Russia is not a security dilemma, and is able to be deconflicted in the future. The EU should change its EaP and rescind its association agreements with Moldova, Georgia, and Ukraine. Further, if these former Soviet Republics decide to align with Russia in the EEU, the EU should make it a priority to

¹⁹³ Oliver Geden, Clemence Marcelis, and Andreas Maurer, "Perspectives for the EU's External Energy Policy," (Working Paper FG 1, 2006, Berlin), 7.

¹⁹⁴ Tom Casier, "The Rise of Energy to Top of the EU-Russia Agenda: From Interdependence to Dependence?," *Geopolitics* 16 (2011), 542.

¹⁹⁵ Carolina Vendil Pallin, "Future Approaches to the Shared Neighborhood," *EU Institute for Security Studies* 26 (2016): 66.

¹⁹⁶ *Ibid.*, 545.

enact a free trade zone with the EEU while finding productive ways to cooperate politically. Should these former Soviet Republics wish to remain unaligned, the EU should create bilateral political and economic agreements which would allow the EU and EEU to interact productively with these nations. Second, it is important to realize that the economic interdependence between the EU and Russia, focused specifically on energy, bodes well for future continued cooperation. What's more, the EU's total economy is roughly fifteen times the size of the Russian economy, while Europe spends roughly seven times more than Russia on military expenditures; France and Germany individually spend more on military expenditures than Russia.¹⁹⁷ Thus, while the EU is dependent on Russian energy, the relationship between Russia and the EU is one of economic interdependence, with the EU as the stronger economy between the two nations.

Conclusions

As a result of conflicts in Bosnia and Kosovo, the EU recognized the need to build a coherent and effective security policy that would allow it to act on the international stage without NATO or the support of the US. The recent Russian recognition of the separatist Georgian territories of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, the annexation of Crimea, and the continuing frozen conflict in the Donbass region of Ukraine have proven that Russia will react militarily in response to the expansionist policies of both NATO and the EU in its "inner abroad." These aggressive responses are due to unsavvy Western foreign policy created incorrectly via the Deterrence Model and not the Spiral Model. Further, NATO's unwillingness to directly respond to Russian aggression in the former Soviet Republics with hard power proved to the EU that the US

¹⁹⁷ Tom Casier, "The Rise of Energy to Top of the EU-Russia Agenda: From Interdependence to Dependence?," *Geopolitics* 16 (2011), 543.

(and thus NATO) is unwilling to confront Russia directly for seemingly insignificant territories on the EU's periphery. Thus, once again, the EU has realized the need for a functional security strategy and an available hard power toolbox in order to either prevent or respond to conflict in the troubled regions of its peripheries.

The EU's CFSP presents itself as the best possible solution to an effective Deterrence Policy against Russia. While the EU's strategic culture and strategic actor-hood are still embryonic and currently evolving into an effective and functional strategic foundation, the CFSP should have both hard and soft power capability in the future, accompanied with a political will to utilize force for realpolitik reasons, as well as the traditional Petersberg tasks which enforce the EU's commitment to R2P. What's more, unlike the US and NATO, the EU has an opportunity to prevent its integration dilemma with Russia from turning into the same security dilemma as Russia and NATO by reconfiguring its EaP. By allowing these nations, considered by Russia to be its "inner abroad," to remain unaligned, yet provide them with economic and political benefits of working with both the EU and the EEU, the EU will be able to effectively deter Russia without risking Russian policy responses based on fear and insecurity. Further, the significant interdependence of the EU and Russian economies will force Russia to tame its aggressive foreign policy towards the EU's periphery.

Lastly, the EU's CFSP presents itself as an opportunity for the US to conduct offshore balancing, a Neorealist action that would allow Europe to finally take the reins of its own defense and allow to US to release itself from this burden and focus elsewhere. In this scenario, the EU would take on most of the burden for deterring Russian as a regional power with its CFSP, allowing the US to free itself of the significant financial

burden that comes with underwriting all of Europe's security requirements. While the CFSP will not be able to transform into a US-type large-scale expeditionary military capability due to the limits of European political will, this will allow the US to retain a significant level of political influence in Europe as a result of a lingering reliance on the US for large-scale military operations. It is important to note that offshore balancing is not isolationism, and that the US would still be committed to intervening in Europe, in the event that the regional balance of power had broken down.

In conclusion, the EU's CFSP presents itself as a viable option that would allow the US to finally step back from underwriting the defense of the EU as it has since the end of World War II. In order for this to happen, the EU must accomplish two things. First, the EU must push the evolution of its strategic culture. As it stands, the 2003 ESS focuses on the utilization of soft power in order to prevent conflict, and the focus on the Petersberg Tasks as its commitment to the principle of R2P. Since the happenings in Georgia and Ukraine, the EU is more inclined to develop a hard power toolbox that it can use for crisis response or realpolitik military operations. In this area, it is important to recognize that the EU's strategic culture is not separate from the individual strategic cultures of its member states; thus, the EU must utilize its institutions and agencies to push the evolution of the strategic culture of the EU to accept the use of hard power. Second, the EU must utilize its institutions and agencies to continue to push the modernization of the European fighting force, and to utilize pooling and sharing concept in order for Europe to acquire the needed strategic capabilities to carry out effective military and civilian security operations.

Should the EU make the required changes to its strategic culture and military capabilities, and become a strategic actor able to utilize coercive diplomacy on the international stage, the EU's CFSP presents itself as a viable deterrence to aggressive Russian foreign policy. In this same vein, should the EU change its expansion policy by reconfiguring its EaP and ending its association agreements with former Soviet Republics, the EU will be able to effectively signal to Russia that it wishes to exit the integration dilemma. Should the EU conduct effective signaling concerning the expansion to former Soviet Republics, the EU and Russia will exit the integration dilemma while not being stuck in a security dilemma as Russia and NATO. In this relationship, the EU would be able to formulate policy via the Spiral Model that would be underwritten with a functional CFSP. This should effectively deter Russia from conducting future military operations into its former Soviet Republics, and should prevent future annexations. This is especially important in light of Russian interests in the separatist conflicts in Transnistria, Nagorno-Karabakh, and the Donbass region of Ukraine. Thus, the CFSP would underwrite an effective Deterrence Regime aimed at tempering aggressive Russian foreign policy and military actions in Europe's periphery for the future.

Conclusion: Summary and Key Findings

This portfolio analyzed how and why the West has failed to formulate effective policy via the Deterrence Model against post-Soviet Russia. As a result of this failure, the EU finds itself on the border of a creeping Russian state, resulting in the EU being much less secure than it was in the decade directly following the Cold War. The failed Deterrence Policy regime between the US/NATO and Russia resulted in a modern security dilemma where Russia is reacting to perceived offensive security policies from the US/NATO. In response, Russia is creating policy that has led to the annexation of South Ossetia and Abkhazia in Georgia, the annexation of Crimea, and the continued armed conflict in the Donbass region in Eastern Ukraine. The security dilemma between the US/NATO and Russia is insurmountable due to both the Cold War and post-Cold War security environments; trust is lost, and the damage is done. Therefore, the EU and its CFSP remain as the last security actor and the last defense policy that are capable of acting as an effective Deterrence Policy regime against Russia. Further, because of the EU's unique relationship with Russia due to economic and energy cooperation, and the direct impact that aggressive Russian foreign policy has on the security of EU member states, the EU is the best-suited actor to effectively deter Russia in the post-Cold War security environment.

The first chapter, *“Effects of the Deterrence and Spiral Models: Russia and the US in the Post-Cold War Security Environment,”* looked at how the West, via the US/NATO, failed to create effective Deterrence Policy after the end of the Cold War. This failure was due to the use of the Deterrence Model, and not the Spiral Model, to create policy towards Russia. Because Russia created policy based on fear and insecurity,

actors must respond with policy via the Spiral Model, which does not seek to coerce or threaten an already insecure state. Instead, Spiral policy accepts the rival states fear and insecurities, and seeks to counteract them with diplomatic actions. Deterrence Policy, with its accompanying threats and warning, works in situations where leaders are not typically acting from perceived threats of others, but are acting due to some personal desire. In the case of post-Cold War Russia, Mr. Putin's aggressive actions can be traced back to the aggressive encirclement of Russia by both NATO and the EU.

Due to these missteps, each "defensive" action the West took to "defend" itself from future Russian power was perceived by Russia as an offensive maneuver to subjugate it on the international stage. Ultimately, the Western encirclement of Russia after the end of the Cold War via the expansion of NATO into former Soviet Republics, the military buildup of NATO within Europe, and the US military buildup within Europe, resulted in a security dilemma between the West and Russia. This paper found that, due to the modern security dilemma and the decades of mistrust between the NATO and Russia, that NATO will continue to be unable to formulate effective Deterrence Policy against Russia in the future.

The second chapter, "*NATO: The State of the Trans-Atlantic Alliance in Light of the New Russian Threat*," examined whether or not the trans-Atlantic alliance is useful in the post-Cold War security environment, given the findings of the first chapter in this portfolio. Based on an examination of the NATO Strategic Concept documents from 1991, 1999, and 2010, it can be determined that, while NATO effectively evolved to stay relevant after the fall of Soviet Russia, this evolution led NATO away from the strict territorial defense of the West from Russia and more into expeditionary operations in the

Global War on Terror. It is important to note that during this time period, NATO continued its expansion into the former Soviet space, effectively bring the West to Russia's doorstep. Most importantly, in 2008 and 2014, when Europe's periphery became the site of Russian military annexations, occupations, and frozen conflicts, NATO failed to respond militarily because of the strategic unimportance of Crimea and Georgia to the US. NATO frequently attributes this inaction due to the fact that neither Georgia nor Ukraine are NATO member states, and thus Article V did not apply.

This paper finds that NATO inaction in both 2008 and 2014, and even current inaction in the Donbass region of eastern Ukraine, was due to NATO's longstanding burden-sharing issues. Since the US is, and always has been, the largest budgetary contributor to NATO, it controls most of the policy choices of the organization. Thus, even though NATO deals with almost exclusively European issues, it is the US that makes the decisions on these issues. Even though aggressive and illegal Russian military actions in both Georgia and Ukraine compromise the EU's security, the US was ultimately unwilling to act militarily on Europe's behalf. Therefore, NATO is an ineffective military and political alliance against the resurgent Russian threat that it created. The territorial expansion of NATO in the post-Cold War security environment was the catalyst for the current security dilemma with Russia, while mission evolution into world-wide expeditionary operations ultimately drew its focus from European defense. What's more, with the US in the driver's seat, NATO is an institution that may not have Europe's best interests at heart.

The third chapter, "*The EU: A Common Foreign and Security Policy to Effectively Deter the Russian Threat,*" presented an alternative to US/NATO-controlled

defense policies that have not increased the EU's relative security against Russia in the post-Cold War security environment. The EU is not currently involved in the security dilemma that exists between the US/NATO and Russia, because the EU does not have a Security and Defense policy with real teeth; the EU simply uses NATO as its security arm, for better or for worse. Thus, the EU has the ability with its CFSP to begin a functional Deterrence Policy regime against Russia with a clean slate. The CFSP can be effectively signaled to Russia as a purely defensive mechanism, in response to recent Russian expansionist actions on the EU's periphery. This aspect of the CFSP frees it from the baggage Jervis discusses at length in *Perception and Misperception in International Politics*, which will always remain present between the US/NATO and Russia.

This paper finds that, while the EU has an opportunity to create an effective Deterrence Policy regime with its CFSP, it has some work to do before this regime can be realized. First, the EU must evolve its strategic culture to allow for the use of military force in both realpolitik and R2P situations. Currently Germany, a juggernaut European power, does not recognize the legal use of force without a U.N. mandate, and, specifically, without the principle of R2P. Thus, without the evolution of this humanitarian-focused hard power, the EU will not be able to operate as a real player in regional security. Second, the EU has failed to get its member states to agree on what an EU military power should look like. The EDA has made great strides as a supranational entity to work with member states on required military capabilities, modernization efforts, and required pooling and sharing programs. However, these efforts have not gone far enough. The EU must be able to mobilize well trained, equipped, and interoperable forces from a ready pool of member states. Currently, this is not the case. EU

Battlegroups exist but have not made a *real* impact on regional security operations. The EU is still funding and maintaining, or failing to maintain, an array of aircraft, ships, and command and control systems by different member states. In order to act as a real deterrent against Russia, the EU, via the EDA, has significant ground to cover in the future.

Recommendations

Chapters one and two of this portfolio demand a viable alternative to the US and NATO as the only available actors that are able formulate effective policy via the Deterrence Model in the post-Cold War security environment. Those chapters explained why, due to mistakes made in the policy process with the Spiral and Deterrence Models, and via poor signaling and Russian misperceptions, the US and NATO created a modern security dilemma with Russia that will not be able to be escaped with Mr. Putin in power. Russia now operates under a Centrist political philosophy where Russia is a great historical “other” that need not abide by Western norms and ideals. The recommendations within chapter three focus on specific actions the EU must take in order to evolve its CFSP to have real teeth and allow it to operate effectively as a regional security actor against Russia. However, simply having an effective strategic culture is not enough to make an entity a successful strategic actor. A strategic actor must be able to threaten the use of force and then be able to deploy that force when necessary, in order to achieve clearly defined and prioritized ends. This demands both a political will *and* a military capability.¹⁹⁸

¹⁹⁸ Janne Haaland Matlary, “When Soft Power Turns Hard: Is an EU Strategic Culture Possible?,” *Security Dialogue* 37, no. 1 (2006), 110.

First, the EU must purposefully evolve its strategic culture. The EU has an embryonic strategic culture that is able to evolve into an effective strategic culture that utilizes both hard and soft power capabilities based on the principle of R2P, and, if need be, *realpolitik*. Currently, the EU does not utilize coercive diplomacy; it focuses on the use of soft power via economic incentives. The EU's Battlegroups have proved that European citizens largely view R2P as the *only* reason to utilize force in the modern era. With a R2P focus, the EU will not be able to develop support for a CFSP that needs both hard and soft power capabilities in order to deal with the type of crises the EU has seen in Bosnia, Kosovo, Libya, Georgia, and Ukraine.

With the impending "Brexit" from the EU, comes great opportunity for member states like France to drive the evolution of an EU strategic culture that contains both soft and hard power options. During its tenure in the EU, Great Britain was an intense "Euro-skeptic," balking at any perceived supranational overstep by EU agencies. It refused to recognize the mission of the EDA and regularly sought out bilateral military action with the US over engagement with the EU and its battlegroup structure. With such a Euro-skeptic juggernaut out of the equation, a military power such as France now has the ability to be in the driver's seat and push for change. As discussed in the introduction to this portfolio, this Brexit "opportunity" will allow France to conduct balancing against other states in the EU, such as Germany, while it allows the EU, as a whole, to conduct hard balancing against the US by means of an increased military buildup and an evolving strategic culture which will allow the EU to emerge as a real security actor on the international stage.

The 2018 strikes against the Assad Regime in Syria are a perfect example of how France is using its role as the foremost military power in the EU to push the union forward as a present security actor in the international community. France participated in the strike as the only EU member state in a multi-lateral operation against the Assad Regime due to the use of chemical weapons in the current Syrian Civil War. France signaled an almost immediate desire to be a part of the strikes, while the French Defense Minister even flew to the 609th Air Operations Center in Qatar, CENTCOM's air battle command and control center, to give both French and American planners awards for their execution of the strike. Make no mistake, France has always possessed expeditionary military might and has carried out successful unilateral military operations in Africa. France possesses the strategic culture that the EU needs as a whole. France is the key to the EU's successful evolution as a strategic actor with both soft and hard power tools in its toolbox and the political will and history to recognize coercive diplomacy as a legitimate use of force.

Second, a strategic actor must be able to threaten the use of force and then be able to deploy that force when necessary, in order to achieve clearly defined and prioritized ends. This demands both a political will *and* a military capability.¹⁹⁹ While the R2P principle will likely evolve into a unifying strategic foundation for the CFSP as a whole, this does not automatically mean the EU is suddenly capable of conducting military operations for R2P. The EU must drive an overhaul of Europe's armed forces at the supranational level utilizing key CFSP institutions in order to successfully influence member states to expend the resources necessary to modernize, and to reverse Europe's

¹⁹⁹ Janne Haaland Matlary, "When Soft Power Turns Hard: Is an EU Strategic Culture Possible?," *Security Dialogue* 37, no. 1 (2006), 110.

trend of demilitarization. European militaries are not only shrinking and in desperate need of funding for modernization, they are grossly ineffective, as a whole, due to disjointed modernization efforts and a lack of a common European capability set. In effect, there is no current European, interoperable pool of assets, there are simply separate military structures in each nation, with separate procurement processes for strategic equipment.

The EDA uses its HHG documents to lay out military expectations for the future, which most recently have focused on the pooling and sharing concept. Pooling and sharing will allow the EU to make the most of limited military budgets across the very different real capabilities of various EU member states. Together, the EU can present a formidable military might. If all 28 armies, 24 air forces, and 21 navies of Europe train and equip, or fail to train and equip their militaries in a vacuum, Europe will continue to flounder and continue to fall back on NATO as its “real” military arm. As argued in chapter three, the EDA is the most important agency in connecting the EU’s security strategy (ends) to the capabilities of the member states (means). While the implementation of the EDA was a giant first necessary step, the EDA has a long way to go. European capabilities in the most expensive areas such as strategic lift, ISR, C4I, and logistics are still wanting. As discussed previously, this portfolio views European integration and security cooperation through a neorealist framework. While the EDA is a supranational institution, it is the individual member states that drive the process, and shape this institution’s actions. A successful pooling and sharing program allows the EU to conduct hard balancing against the US by providing an alternative to the US/NATO military structure for European security. It allows Europe an alternative functioning

military apparatus that has no dependence on the political will of US politicians for action. Further, it allows European juggernauts such as France and Germany to shape the future of the alliance in an image suitable to them. Thus, the CFSP is influenced by both the current unipolar system international system and by Europe's multipolar system.

While the EU has significant work to accomplish in both its strategic culture and its execution of the pooling and sharing program, the EU possess the capability to become an effective regional security actor, as proven by its CSDP missions to date. Since 2011, the EU has deployed over 70,000 soldiers and civilians in support of over 34 CFSP operations around the globe.²⁰⁰ The EU, as a civilian actor, is highly specialized in stabilization and reconstruction operations. While all EU CFSP missions have been at the consent of the host nation and have taken place in permissive or semi-permissive environments, CFSP missions have impacted regional security by promoting good governance and positively impacted stability within the EU's periphery.²⁰¹ The EU is capable of conducting larger scale crisis response and PSOs in the future, and even more realpolitik operations, should its strategic culture and military capability continue to evolve. Under the CSDP, the EU seeks to manage crises, build the capacity of partner nations, and protect Europeans through both military and civilian means. The EU deploys to monitor borders, provide police and judicial expertise, dismantle human trafficking networks, disrupt flows of weapons, and train partners' security services.²⁰² Since 2003, there have been 34 CSDP missions in over 20 different countries. During military operations, the EU typically provides forces to train partner nations and to contribute to

²⁰⁰ EU, "European Security and Defense: The Basics," (Pamphlet, Brussels, 2017).

²⁰¹ Michael Merlingen, *EU Security Policy: What It Is, How it Works, Why it Matters* (London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2013), 127.

²⁰² EU, "European Security and Defense: The Basics," (Pamphlet, Brussels, 2017).

the security in post-conflict environments. In its civilian missions, the EU deploys legal experts, police, borders and customs officials, among others, to contribute to the rule of law in regions affected by crises.

However, the EU's military and civilian CFSP missions prove that the EU is gradually evolving its strategic culture while emerging as a security actor. Its military missions, however small and however amenable the environment, are allowing the EU to show its member nations that hard power capabilities are required to have a positive impact on its periphery. What's more, the exposure to NATO and UN military equipment exposes member nations to their need for a modernized force. Through its civilian missions, the EU is proving to the world that it possesses a much-needed capability that, as of late, the US has shown it does not possess. Further, the EU missions to the Balkans and Caucuses prove that the EU is interested in becoming more than a by standing in the security affairs in its periphery, and that it is interested in becoming a full-fledged security provider in order to prevent these conflicts from occurring in the first place.

Limitations

Certain limitations exist within this thesis portfolio. The first paper could be expanded to look at more specific policies the West formulated via the Deterrence Model and pair those failed policies with specific actions from Mr. Putin or top Russian defense officials in response. For example, a case study of the creation of the two US Navy Aegis Ashore missile defense facilities in Romania and Poland and the accompanying Russian response of deploying strategic bombers to Crimea would have been an effective way to prove Russian reactions to Western policy are formulated via the Spiral Model, making Western Deterrence Policy completely ineffective. There are multiple case studies

showing this action/reaction dynamic between the West and Russia, with accompanying Russian rhetoric directly discussing its following strategic moves. Such case studies could have been useful in proving that the US and NATO are incapable of effectively deterring Russia in any meaningful way and simply act to further entrench the US/NATO and Russia in a post-Cold War security dilemma.

The second chapter of this portfolio could be expanded to include a case study on the Russian annexation of Crimea. The case study should focus on perceived Russian neo-imperial intent to further expand its empire to include countries such as Moldova, Ukraine, the Baltic States and central Asia, among other historically geostrategic regions previously mentioned, due to Western encirclement and expansion into former Soviet Republics. This case study would serve as further proof that it is of the utmost importance for useful policy to be created via the Spiral Model to be employed against Russia via the EU, as it would prove Russian intent to expand its borders into states and territories such as Belarus, the Transnistria and Gagauz regions of Moldova, Armenia, Central Asia, the caucuses, and the Baltic States, if provoked. All of these territories were a part of the former Soviet empire, retain some sort of semi-autonomous status, and contain a large population of ethnic Russians separated from the motherland during the break-up of the empire. The viability of the CIS and the EEC should also be examined, as well as the probability of President Putin realizing a Eurasian Community to rival that of the EU.

The last chapter of this portfolio could be expanded to gauge current European thoughts on the use of coercive diplomacy throughout various key EU member states. My recommendations rely on the premise that France possesses the ability, especially with the exit of Great Britain, to push the EU into an effective pooling and sharing regime and

push the evolution of Europe's strategic culture to include hard power as a real and viable option. However, I have not accounted for the political beliefs of entire generations of Germans who view hard power as both illegal and immoral. I have also not discussed the impact of "neutrals," such as Switzerland, or "others," such as Denmark, who do not participate in the CFSP at all. Polls and internal political discussions within specific EU member states such as Germany, Switzerland, and Denmark, should be considered. Such research would show how much of an impact these populations could have on deterring the use of hard power via the CFSP in the future.

The Future

The EU's CFSP presents itself as the best possible solution to an effective Deterrence Policy regime against Russia. While the EU's strategic culture and strategic actor-hood are still embryonic and currently evolving into an effective and functional strategic foundation, the CFSP will have both hard and soft power capability in the future, accompanied with a political will to utilize force for realpolitik reasons, as well as the traditional Petersberg tasks which enforce the EU's commitment to R2P. What's more, unlike the US and NATO, the EU has an opportunity to prevent its integration dilemma with Russia from turning into the same security dilemma as Russia and NATO by reconfiguring its EaP. By allowing these nations, considered by Russia to be its "inner abroad," to remain unaligned, yet provide them with economic and political benefits of working with the EU, the EU will be able to effectively deter Russia without risking aggressive Russian policy responses. Further, the significant interdependence of the EU and Russian economies will force Russia to tame its aggressive foreign policy towards

the EU's periphery if it receives signals from the EU that it will not be tolerated unless Russia wishes to risk military action against it.

Lastly, the EU's CFSP presents itself as an opportunity for the US to conduct offshore balancing, a Neorealist action that would allow Europe to finally take the reins of its own defense and allow the US to release itself from Europe's security burden and focus elsewhere. In this scenario, the EU would take on most of the burden for deterring Russia as a regional power with its CFSP, allowing the US to free itself of the significant financial burden that comes with underwriting all of Europe's security requirements. While the CFSP will not be able to transform into a US styled, large-scale expeditionary military capability due to the limits of European political will, this will allow the US to retain a significant level of political influence in Europe as a result of a lingering reliance on the US for large-scale military operations. It is important to note that offshore balancing is not isolationism, and that the US would still be committed to intervening in Europe, in the event that the regional balance of power had broken down due to Article V requirements.

Future areas of study should include how the EU's CFSP works in conjunction with NATO in the future. Chapter two of this portfolio discusses the option of scaling back existing NATO infrastructure in Europe once the CFSP is realized, and scaling back NATO operations to reflect the need to execute Article V operations only. In the future, it is possible Article V operations are simply ad hoc operations without requirements for significant NATO infrastructure present in Europe; most of the required multi-national training would be accomplished via US and EU military exercises. As the EU builds up its CFSP with effective EU Battlegroups that are trained, equipped, and modernized,

NATO will possess equipment, manning, and funding that should now be held and staffed by the EU. Significant research should be conducted to develop a timeline and milestones for the NATO to CFSP transition in the future, while the minimum requirements for NATO in Europe should be developed.

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Curriculum Vitae

Rachael Marie Deskin, a York, Pennsylvania native, received her Bachelor of Arts in Political Science and Law & Policy from Dickinson College in 2009. After Graduation, she commissioned in the US Navy as a Surface Warfare Officer. She has deployed to the USEUCOM, USAFRICOM, and USCENTCOM Areas of Operation and is currently the Weapons Officer on the USS LABOON (DDG 58) homeported at Naval Station Norfolk, Virginia. She completed Joint Military Professional Education from the Naval War College in 2019. This work marks the completion of her Master of Arts in Government with a concentration in Security Studies from Johns Hopkins University. She is married and lives in Norfolk, Virginia.